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ESSAY
THE SIXTIES SHIFT TO FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE
COURTS: AN ARGUMENT FOR PRAGMATISM AND
POLITICS
MARY BECKER*
Conventional wisdom tells a simple story of feminism during
the first seventy years of this century. As the century opened,
the women's movement was single-mindedly focused on suffrage,
arguing that women should have the vote both because they are
men's equals and because they are different from men in that
their finer sensibilities will transform and purify politics. When
women finally won suffrage in August of 1920, the coalition of
women's organizations that had worked so long and so hard to
achieve this goal fell apart from sheer exhaustion.'
Feminism slept during the next forty-plus years.2 The depres-
sion saw women forced out of a tight labor market that reserved
jobs for male breadwinners.3 The 1940s saw women drawn into
and then pushed out of the labor market as men left for and re-
turned from World War II. 4 The 1950s were particularly dismal
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1. See MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
14 (1994); JUDITH HOLE & ELLEN LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM 13-14 (1971).
2. See HOLE & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 14.
3. See Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIZ.
L. REV. 431, 436 (1990).
4. See id.
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for middle-class white women, who were once more relegated to
the domestic sphere and repeatedly told that any well-adjusted
woman finds complete happiness and fulfillment caring for her
husband and children.5
The second wave of the feminist movement suddenly became
visible in 1963 with the publication of Betty Friedan's book, The
Feminine Mystique.6 Sameness feminism and formal equality
arguments dominated this wave; specifically, the idea that wom-
en and men are similarly situated and, therefore, should have
the same rights and opportunities.! The second wave lasted
until well into the 1980s, when difference feminism suddenly
emerged with its emphasis on the differences between women
and men and the need to value women's lifestyles as well as
men's.
8
In this essay, I tell a more complicated story about feminism
during the twentieth century and about how feminists came to
focus so overwhelmingly on formal equality by 1970. Feminism
never quite died between suffrage and the second wave, though
it did suffer a number of setbacks. From 1920 to 1963, feminists
were divided into two hostile camps, one supporting a formal-
equality approach-sameness feminism-and the other support-
ing legislation protecting women in light of their different needs
and responsibilities relative to men--difference feminism By
1970, however, this difference strand had disappeared. Everyone
was on the formal equality bandwagon.
In the first section of this essay, I explain this shift. I describe
the objections to formal equality at the beginning of the sixties
and how those objections disappeared over the next few years.
In the second section, I assess the successes and failures of the
formal equality approach that has dominated feminism during
the second wave. I also consider the extent to which the prob-
lems that have appeared were foreseen during the sixties when
the crucial shift took place.
5. See id.
6. See FLORA DAVIS, MOVING THE MOUNTAIN: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERI-
CA SINCE 1960 50-52 (1991).
7. See id. at 48.
8. See id. at 475-76.
9. See id. at 29-34.
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In the third section, I consider options for the future. We live
in a far different world than did the feminists of 1970. I suggest
that in the future, formal equality and constitutional cases in
the courts will be less useful and more problematic than they
have been in the past. I propose that we use a new Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) to shift to an approach that relies on
women's political power to achieve equality rather than on judg-
es enforcing formal equality.
I. THE SmITES SHFT
After suffrage, one group of activists supported a formal
equality approach under an Equal Rights Amendment. These
women argued that an ERA was necessary to eliminate the
many. laws discriminating between women and men. At the
time, laws routinely discriminated with respect to regulation of
employment and families, obligations of citizenship, competency,
and age, as well as crimes and sentences.
A few examples from each area will give the reader a sense of
the breadth of sex-specific regulation. State laws often specified
maximum hours or minimum wages for women workers in gen-
eral or in certain industries, or banned women from bartending
or working in factories at night." Family law was almost en-
tirely sex-specific, with the obligation of support imposed only on
husbands and fathers, and a preference for mothers as custodi-
ans of children of tender years after a divorce." The man's do-
micile determined the domicile of the family 2 and the man was
entitled to the homemaking and caretaking services of his
wife. 3 In addition, many states still denied married women full
rights to contract and to convey real property.'4
As full citizens, only men were subject to the draft5 and
could engage in military combat, 6 limiting to men the avail-
10. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 23, 26.
11. See id. at 26.
12. See id. at 26-27.
13. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATEs 302 (2d ed. 1987).
14. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 27.
15. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) (noting that because women
are not eligible for combat, they are not similarly situated for purposes of the draft).
16. See id.
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ability of the powerful preferences veterans often received for
state employment. 7 Many states also denied women the ability
to serve on juries under the same rules as men for years after
the extension of suffrage. 8 The law generally regarded women
as competent in various areas at younger ages than men: age of
majority tended to be lower for women than men, and women
were allowed to marry at younger ages than men. 9
Criminal law routinely distinguished between the sexes in
rape and statutory rape statutes, which defined rape as some-
thing a man did to a woman. ° Often, prostitution statutes
made the activity of the sex worker but not the activity of the
sex consumer a crime.2" Some sentencing statutes imposed
harsher penalties on women than men.22 Laws governing places
of public accommodation or entertainment often banned women
from bars, wrestling matches, and other events.' ERA support-
ers regarded the ERA as important to eradicate these and other
discriminatory laws with a single blow.
Many women activists opposed the ERA, however. They wor-
ried about the consequences of eliminating all sex-specific family
law rules and they supported sex-specific protectionist legisla-
tion, especially laws purportedly "protecting" women workers
because of their special needs and responsibilities.24 This posi-
tion seems conservative, even reactionary, today. At the time,
though, the anti-ERA position was associated with progressives
17. Cf. Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979)
(holding that the state's preference for veterans did not discriminate against women
even though the foreseeable result was the virtual exclusion of women from the
higher echelons of state government employment).
18. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961) (upholding state statute that au-
tomatically placed men on juror rolls but placed only those women who, on their
own initiative, asked to be listed on the rolls).
19. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 26.
20. See Goldberg v. State, 395 A.2d 1213, 1217 (Md. 1979) (interpreting a tradi-
tional rape statute); BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (describing sex-specific stat-
utory rape laws). A typical statute might provide that "[a] person is guilty of rape
in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another per-
son." Goldberg, 385 A.2d at 1217. The statute is sex-specific because only men may
engage in vaginal intercourse.
21. See BECKER ET AL, supra note 1, at 26.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
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and the ERA position was supported by economic conservatives
opposed to government regulation of employment."
The progressive position opposing the ERA had its roots in
opposition to nineteenth-century labor practices. Appalled by the
sweatshop conditions under which many immigrants and other
workers labored for low wages in American workplaces, reform-
ers began pushing for minimum wage legislation, maximum
hour limitations, and other protectionist legislation during the
nineteenth century.26 Many of these reformers, like Jane
Addams, Lillian Wald, and Florence Kelley, were women who
worked in settlement houses providing direct services to people
in lower income and immigrant neighborhoods. Progressive
women coming out of this movement tended to have a strong
commitment to legislation that treated women and men differ-
ently.2
8
Indeed, for a few years early in this century, the only constitu-
tional legislation protecting workers applied exclusively to wom-
en. In Lochner v. New York,29 the Supreme Court in 1905 held
unconstitutional a state statute limiting the number of hours
employees could work in bakeries. 0 Three years later, in Mul-
ler v. Oregon,3 the Supreme Court upheld similar legislation
limiting the hours of women working in laundries, stressing the
importance of women's role as mothers and their special needs
for protection.32 In 1917, the Supreme Court upheld a maxi-
mum hours law applicable to all workers,33 but progressive re-
formers continued to see sex-specific protectionist legislation as
important because, then as now, women working for wages often
worked a second shift at home,34 because some protections had
25. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 31-32.
26. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 13.
27. See id. See generally ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 208-15 (rev. ed. 1975) (discussing the role
reformist devices, such as settlement houses, had on women's rights).
28. See FLEXNER, supra note 27, at 213-15.
29. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
30. See id. at 64.
31. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
32. See id. at 421-23.
33. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426, 433 (1917).
34. See KATHERINE POLLAK ELLICKSON, THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE
1998] 213
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
as yet only been enacted for women, 5 and because some sex-
specific legislation was necessary to protect women from work
requirements, such as lifting heavy objects. 6 ERA opponents
also feared that the ERA indiscriminately would wipe out all
sex-specific family laws, such as family support laws." More
fundamentally, to progressives and socialists, the ERA was an
individualistic approach that was inconsistent with their basic
frames of reference and their analysis of social causes for class
problems. 8
Protectionist legislation was not entirely bad for women,
though much of it was. Laws banning women from certain kinds
of employment, such as working in factories at night, hurt wom-
en by limiting them to lower paying night jobs such as cleaning
offices and hospitals.3 9 Protectionist laws limiting women's
hours in certain industries, however, such as maximum hours
limits on women employed in laundries,4 ° probably helped
many women in situations in which employers nevertheless con-
tinued to employ women. Most women did work a second shift
and benefited from laws that prohibited employers from requir-
ing that they work more than ten or twelve hours a day in a
laundry.41
A majority of the members of the suffrage coalition and a ma-
jority of politically active women opposed the ERA in the
1920s.42 Only "a tiny minority of women activists (primarily
from elite backgrounds) were willing to jeopardize what most
STATUS OF WOMEN: ITS FORMATION, FUNCTIONING AND CONTRIBUTION 6 (1976).
35. See id.
36. See JUDITH PATERSON, BE SOMEBODY: A BIOGRAPHY OF MARGUERITE RAWALT
140 (1986).
37. See ELLICKSON, supra note 34, at 6.
38. I thank Caroline Goddard for this insight. For a discussion of how progressive
reformers used "gender-specific" legislation as a means of advancing class-specific
goals, see Kathryn Kish Sklar, Why Were Most Politically Active Women Opposed to
the ERA in the 1920s?, in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE ERA
25, 28 (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986).
39. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 32.
40. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (holding Oregon regula-
tion promulgating maximum hours for women working in laundries constitutional).
41. See id.
42. See Sklar, supra note 38, at 25.
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women saw as essential protections for female workers and for
mothers."'
The National Women's Party (NWP) introduced the ERA. 4
Alice Paul had organized the NWP during the final drive for suf-
frage;45 it used radical tactics-such as picketing the White
House, being arrested, and staging hunger strikes while in pris-
on 46-borrowed from the English suffragettes.' After suffrage,
NWP supported a formal equality approach and an ERA.48 Two
other large national organizations of elite women also supported
the ERA by 1960: the National Federation of Business and Pro-
fessional Women's Clubs (BPW) and the General Federation of
Women's Clubs.49 These were sameness feminists, women com-
mitted to achieving equality by requiring that laws treat simi-
larly situated women and men the same.5"
The language of the original ERA read:
Men and women shall have equal rights throughout the Unit-
ed States and in every place subject to its jurisdiction. Con-
gress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.5
Between 1923 and 1943, this ERA was introduced yearly in Con-
gress. 2 From 1940 on, the Republican party endorsed the ERA
because it would eliminate protectionist legislation disliked by
business.3 Democrats tended to oppose the ERA because the
Democratic party was closely aligned with organized labor, a
powerful advocate of protectionist legislation.' Throughout this
43. Id. at 26.
44. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 29.
45. See HOLE & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 78.
46. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 31.
47. Alice Paul spent several years in England where, when jailed for her suffrage
activities, she went on a hunger strike and was forcibly fed. See FLEXNER, supra
note 27, at 263.
48. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 33.
49. See id. at 33-34.
50. See id. at 29, 34.
51. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 8 (1986).
52. See id. at 9.
53. See id. at 8-9.
54. See BLANCHE LINDEN-WARD & CAROL HURD GREEN, AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE
1960s: CHANGING THE FUTURE 2-3 (1993).
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period, the ERA was defeated by a coalition of social conserva-
tives, which was opposed to change in the status of women, and
democrats and progressives, like Eleanor Roosevelt, who feared
that the ERA would invalidate sex-specific protective legisla-
tion55 as well as sex-specific family support laws aiding women
and children at divorce.
56
From the passage of the suffrage amendment through the be-
ginning of the 1960s, these two feminist groups remained firmly
opposed to the other's strategy. Three women played pivotal
roles in the shift during the sixties from gridlock to agreement
on seeking equality through the courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment and under an ERA: Esther Peterson, Marguerite
Rawalt, and Pauli Murray. Each of these women worked on
President Kennedy's Presidential Commission on the Status of
Women (PCSW), and the report of that commission was the first
step towards ending the gridlock.
A. The Presidential Commission on the Status of Women
The story of the PCSW begins with Esther Peterson. Peterson
was born in Provo, Utah, in 1906."7 Her parents were immi-
grants from Denmark; her father was a superintendent of
schools and her mother kept boarders.58 Peterson went to
Brigham Young University and Columbia University's Teachers
College.59 During the 1930s, she held a number of teaching po-
sitions, including one at the Bryn Mawr Summer School for
Women Workers in Industry, a program combining "Shake-
speare, drama and socialism," according to Peterson's son.6°
Attendees were garment workers, telephone operators, and milli-
ners.6 Peterson subsequently worked for several labor un-
55. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 22.
56. See ELLICKSON, supra note 34, at 6.
57. See Irvin Molotsky, Esther Peterson Dies at 91; Worked to Help Consumers,
N.Y. TMIES, Dec. 22, 1997, at B7.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id.
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ions.62 When President Kennedy appointed her Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor and Director of the Women's Bureau in 1961, she
was a friend of Eleanor Roosevelt with deep roots in progressive
social movements.63
Several pressures led to the creation of the PCSW. Peterson,
one of the highest ranking women in the Kennedy Administra-
tion, was opposed to the ERA." For years during the fifties,
Congressperson Celler, a Democrat from New York and an ERA
opponent, had been urging a national commission on women to
produce "a constructive plan... that would overcome discrimi-
nations, provide necessary services, and be an alternative to the
Equal Rights Amendment."" Peterson suggested a commission
on the status of women in the hope that it would "substitute
constructive recommendations for the present troublesome and
futile agitation about the 'equal rights amendment,"'66 which
seemed to be gathering growing support. Johnson firmly sup-
ported the idea of a commission and helped organize it.6" The
administration deflected criticism from Eleanor Roosevelt,
among others, that Kennedy had appointed few women to top
governmental positions despite the support of women activists
during his campaign and Kennedy's own promises of equal
rights and appointments of women to high positions.69 A com-
mission could suggest commitment to women's rights without
actually doing anything.
President Kennedy issued an executive order creating the
PCSW in December 1961.70 Eleanor Roosevelt chaired the com-
mission until her death in 1962."' She was a progressive and
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 125.
65. ELLICKSON, supra note 34, at 5-6.
66. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 34.
67. See LINDEN-WARD & GREEN, supra note 54, at 3. The head of the Women's
Bureau under Eisenhower, Alice Leopold, also supported the ERA. See id. at 2.
68. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 131.
69. See id. at 124.
70. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 35.
71. See id. Johnson supported Roosevelt for the position. Kennedy was not a great
fan of Roosevelt and even refused to personally invite her to serve as chair. Esther
1998] 217
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had long supported sex-specific protectionist legislation and op-
posed the ERA, but by the spring of 1961, her position against
the ERA was softening.72 In a speech that spring to the Lucy
Stone League, Roosevelt said: "Many of us opposed the amend-
ment because we felt it would do away with protection in the
labor field. Now with unionization, there is no reason why you
shouldn't have it if you want it.""
The commission consisted of twenty-six members-fifteen
women and eleven men-and included "[clabinet officers, mem-
bers of Congress, two college presidents, a magazine editor, la-
bor leaders, the national presidents of several major women's
organizations, and Washington attorney Marguerite Rawalt."74
Esther Peterson picked the members, almost all of whom op-
posed the ERA.75 Although the purpose of the PCSW was "to
undermine" the ERA, Peterson realized it was important to in-
clude at least one supporter of the ERA, and that one person
was Marguerite Rawalt.
7 6
Perhaps the reason Peterson included Rawalt as the lone ERA
supporter was the impression Rawalt had made on Peterson
when they met in the summer of 1961 at the BPW convention,
at which Orval Faubus, the segregationist governor of Arkansas,
gave the opening address." Esther Peterson had agreed to
speak at the convention and asked Rawalt if they could meet for
breakfast prior to her speech.7" When Peterson arrived, "she de-
clared: 'I've come to face my enemies and I'm scared to death.
I've come to say why I believe what I believe. I intend to uphold
my views on these labor standards laws."'79 This is what
Rawalt had feared: that Peterson would focus on what divided
women, widening the "long-standing breach between ERA sup-
Peterson performed this function. See id.
72. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 139.
73. Id.
74. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 35.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 34-35. As the executive order that created the Commission proposed
an objective evaluation of the ERA, "a number of pro-ERA organizations supported
PCSW." Id. at 35.
77. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 126-27.
78. See id. at 127.
79. Id.
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porters and women from the labor movement.""° Rawalt re-
plied: "You will not make any friends with that speech.... I
wish we could find some other basis[,] ... something we all
agree on. I hope you won't go so strong ....'"
They discussed the reasons for their positions on the ERA. Pe-
terson explained that it would take years of litigation and delay
for the ERA to do anything for the "women at the bottom," and
in the meantime these women "would lose the little protection
they had from laws that make it illegal for them to work long
hours at jobs that are too hard for them-and poorly paid."82
Rawalt insisted that, in the long run, the ERA would help all
women and that protective laws often hurt women, keeping
them out of the best jobs and preventing them from being pro-
moted.' She stressed that protectionist laws, not the ERA,
were discriminatory and it was discrimination that kept women
at the bottom." Peterson responded that she would continue to
oppose the ERA until there were strong minimum wage and
equal pay laws.85
Her voice rising, she added, "I've always thought ERA women
weren't with us on the equal pay question--didn't care about
it. Some of you have businesses and you yourselves pay wom-
en less than men. As soon as you come along and support us
on that and see that your poor sisters and your black sisters
are taken care of, I'll join you."88
Peterson changed her speech to stress "her hopes for women in
the future rather than BPW's failure to support blue-collar wom-
en."87 More importantly, despite their differences, Rawalt and
Peterson established a lasting relationship at this meeting. Pe-
terson later recalled:
80. Id. at 127-28.
81. Id. at 128 (quoting Marguerite Rawalt).
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 129.
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With that conversation, Marguerite Rawalt introduced me to
the thinking of women I had no contact with. I really didn't
know what they thought. I just knew we had always dis-
agreed. But she accepted me. She was an honest woman, who
could see broader issues-maybe the only one-and she lis-
tened to me and my reasons for why I thought the way I did.
She helped me to draw my circle wider."
Perhaps as a result of this conversation, Peterson decided
that, although she wanted the PCSW to avoid the ERA impasse
and produce a practical and meaningful set of goals, it would be
a mistake to ignore entirely the pro-ERA position. 9 In Decem-
ber of 1961, Esther Peterson called Marguerite Rawalt and
asked her to become part of the PCSW.° Rawalt was thrilled
and remained elated even after she saw the newspaper descrip-
tions of the commission makeup and realized that she was the
lone ERA supporter.9
Rawalt was a tall, energetic attorney from west Texas who
had worked as a tax lawyer for the Internal Revenue Service in
Washington for years. 2 She had been born in a tiny Illinois
farming community, Prairie City, in 1895,"3 and she was the
oldest of three children and the only daughter. 4 Her family
moved from Illinois, eventually settling in Texas.95 As a young
girl, Rawalt arrived in Texas in a covered wagon. 8 She worked
her way through the University of Texas and George Washing-
ton Law School in Washington (after Georgetown refused to ad-
mit her because of her sex).97 Rawalt was outgoing, intense,98
a can-do person, passionately committed to equality for women
and convinced that protectionist legislation did far more harm
than good. Rawalt was, in Peterson's words, "'so brilliant and
88. Id. at 128-29.
89. See id. at 131.
90. See id. at 130.
91. See id. at 130-31.
92. See id. at xvi-xvii, 125.
93. See id. at 3.
94. See id. at 5-6.
95. See id. at 6.
96. See id. at viii.
97. See id. at 37-38.
98. See id. at 135.
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had all those degrees and everything; and, although I was op-
posed to it, I knew we couldn't disregard ERA.' 9 9 Rawalt "was
a past president of both BPW and NAWL (the National Associa-
tion of Women Lawyers), a member of the NWP, and had been
the first woman ever elected president of the Federal Bar Associ-
ation."10
Despite Peterson's hope that the commission would derail
ERA and the fact that she packed it with ERA opponents (except
for Rawalt), PCSW "produced a compromise that partly mended
the rift in the women's movement."' PCSW set in motion forc-
es that ultimately would merge with the new wave of the femi-
nist movement, and by the end of the decade, seek both an ERA
and sex equality through judicial decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Commission members divided into six committees, each head-
ed by "two commission members with about ten additional mem-
bers to be selected by the Women's Bureau."' 2 The six commit-
tees were to study: (1) education; (2) home and community; (3)
employment; (4) protective labor legislation; (5) social insurance
and taxes; and (6) civil and political rights.' 3 Each committee
had two years to study its particular issues; all were to report
back to the commission in October 1963.04
The committee charged with studying the ERA was the Com-
mittee on Civil and Political Rights, and Marguerite Rawalt,
together with Congressperson Edith Green of Oregon, chaired
it.' Rawalt managed to get two women who supported the
ERA appointed to the committee,0 6 and several other women
99. Id. at 125 (quoting Esther Peterson).
100. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 35.
101. Id. at 34-35.
102. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 134.
103. See ELLIcKSON, supra note 34, at 2 (listing committee reports).
104. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 134.
105. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 35.
106. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 135. The two women were Mrs. H. Lee
Ozbirn, president of the General Federation of Women's Clubs and Katherine Peden,
president of BPW. See id.
1998]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
on the committee became supportive.0 7 A number of members
were opposed to the ERA and some were neutral.0 8
Pauli Murray was invited to serve on the Committee on Civil
and Political Rights in the spring of 1962.1"9 Murray was an
African-American lawyer, "a senior fellow at Yale Law School, a
writer, a scholar, a civil rights and labor activist who had known
Eleanor Roosevelt since the 1930s, she was bone-thin with light
brown skin and an intensity that matched Marguerite's own.
But she was fiercer, less outgoing, more intellectual, less in-
clined to spread herself thin.""0 Murray neither supported nor
endorsed the ERA: "[I was not actually opposed to the amend-
ment... I thought it had little chance of getting through Con-
gress in the near future.""'
The first meeting of the Committee on Civil and Political
Rights was in August of 1962, just after the passage of the
Equal Pay Act."' The committee held a debate on the merits of
ERA conflict: "The American Nurses Association and AAUW
presented the protective argument while spokeswomen from
BPW and the National Women's Party defended ERA.""' Al-
though Pauli Murray did not support discriminatory laws, she
suggested that "women should go through the courts-the way
blacks were doing-rather than try to amend the constitu-
tion.""4 The Supreme Court could use the equal protection
clause to overturn laws that discriminated against women on
107. See id. at 135-36. Mary Eastwood was a young lawyer from the Attorney
General's office who was to help write committee reports. See id. at 136. Catherine
East was a staff assistant to the Committee on Federal Employment and attended
meetings of all the committees. See id.
108. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 35.
109. See PAULI MURRAY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A BLACK ACTIVIST, FEMINIST,
LAWYER, PRIEST, AND POET 347 (1987).
110. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 135.
111. MURRAY, supra note 109, at 349.
112. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 138-39. The Equal Pay Act requires that
women and men doing the same job receive the same pay. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1994). Esther Peterson and other progressives saw it as consistent with traditional
goals of the Women's Bureau, i.e., "protecting working women from the perspective
of their social roles as mothers and wives-not from any inherently independent eco-
nomic right." PATERSON, supra note 36, at 232-33.
113. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 138.
114. Id.
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the basis of sex just as it had used it to overturn laws that dis-
criminated against African-Americans on the basis of race." 5
Murray proposed that the commission recommend test cases "as
a compromise between ERA advocates and supporters of the pro-
tective labor laws.""'
Marguerite Rawalt was doubtful."' The courts had been rul-
ing against women in constitutional cases since the founding of
the republic."' On October 1 and 2, 1962, the full commission
met and considered Murray's proposal."' To Rawalt's surprise,
Murray had been asked to present her suggestion directly to the
commission, though her committee had never fully considered
it.2' By the time Murray concluded, Rawalt "was flushed and
angry." 2' She felt that the cards were hopelessly stacked
against the ERA and that without Eleanor Roosevelt, who had
begun to soften her anti-ERA position but was now in the hos-
pital, there was no way ERA supporters could keep the Commis-
sion from opposing it. 2
B. The Murray Strategy on Paper
In December of 1962, Pauli Murray submitted a paper to the
Committee on Civil and Political Rights describing in some de-
tail her proposal to seek equality through the Fourteenth
Amendment rather than an ERA."2 The Supreme Court had
already held racial classifications in public education unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment,2 4 and Murray em-
phasized the similarities between race and sex discrimination,
115. See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 35-36.
116. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 138.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 139.
119. See id. at 138-39.
120. See id. at 139.
121. Id.
122. See id.
123. See Memorandum from Pauli Murray to the Committee on Civil and Political
Rights, President's Commission on the Status of Women, "A Proposal to Reexamine
the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to State Laws and Practices Which
Discriminate on the Basis of Sex Per Se" (Dec. 1962) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Murray Memorandum].
124. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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relying on two important early authorities on the parallels be-
tween racism and sexism: Gunnar Myrdal, author of a 1944 clas-
sic on racism, An American Dilemma, and Helen Hacker, author
of a 1951 analysis of women's status as a minority group."
Myrdal discussed the similarities between the position of
women and African-Americans, especially in the South.'26
Myrdal identified pre-industrialization paternalism in the South
as a system that denied both slaves and women full humani-
ty.'27 He noted the historical, intellectual, and personal connec-
tions between the nineteenth century women's movement and
the abolition movement.
128
Hacker delineated a number of parallels between the treat-
ment of women and African-Americans. Both were identified
primarily by certain physical characteristics; seen as having
smaller brains, lower intelligence, and fewer geniuses; more
125. See Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 11-12. In addition to Myrdal
and Hacker, Murray quoted a portion of a 1935 article by Blanche Crozier, arguing
that just as race-based classifications suggest inferiority (of African-Americans), so
too sex-based classifications suggest women's inferiority. See id. at 12 (quoting
Blanche Crozier, Constitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L. REV.
723, 727-28 (1935)). Crozier wrote:
Race and sex are in every way comparable classes; and if exclusion in
one case is a discrimination implying inferiority, it would seem that it
must be in the other also. And if such discrimination implying inferiority
is a violation of the equal protection of the laws in the case of one of
these classes, it ought to be also in the case of the other, assuming that
the guarantee of equal protection extends to both of the classes.
Not only are race and sex entirely comparable classes, but there are
no others like them. They are large, permanent, unchangeable, natural
classes. No other kind of class is susceptible to implications of innate
inferiority. Aliens, for instance, are essentially a temporary class, like an
age class. Only permanent and natural classes are open to those deep,
traditional implications which become attached to classes regardless of
the actual qualities of the members of the class. This is the only kind of
class prejudice which can be reached by laws aimed not toward guarding
against the unjust effect of the prejudice in the particular case but to-
ward a general upholding of the dignity and equality, the legal status, of
the class.
Id.
126. See generally GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1073-78 (citing both
the historical and societal similarities between women and African-Americans).
127. See id. at 1073.
128. See generally id. at 1073-78 (citing both the historical and societal similarities
between women and African-Americans).
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emotional; happy and content in their place; and socially and
professionally segregated.'29
Murray noted that the Supreme Court had resolved recent
constitutional challenges to sex discrimination by a 5-4 or 6-3
split 30 and suggested that the Supreme Court might well find
sex discrimination unconstitutional in the near future if it were
to face an appropriate case with well-developed arguments sup-
ported by many amici.'' Murray therefore proposed that wom-
en model equal protection arguments after those that had suc-
ceeded for race in Brown v. Board of Education'32 and that
good cases should be deliberated, selected, and litigated by some
group or coalition.1
3
In 1962, when Murray wrote this memorandum suggesting
that women model constitutional litigation after the race cases,
the race cases reaching the Court were challenges to Jim Crow
segregation laws,' 4 which were always and obviously harmful
to African-Americans. There were no affirmative action plans,
let alone challenges to such plans. The legal situation of women
was far more complex. Many members of PCSW regarded sex-
specific protectionist legislation, such as the maximum hours for
women working in laundries in Oregon upheld in Muller, as
good for women. Similarly, most women on the commission as-
sumed that women who were wives and mothers would have
"the responsibility of homemaking and child rearing ... whether
or not they work[ed] outside the home."'35 For these women,
the sex-specific family law rules protecting mothers and caretak-
ers made a great deal of sense. 35
129. See Helen Hacker, Women As a Minority Group, 30 SOC. FORCES 60, 65
(1951).
130. See Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 25.
131. See id. at 27, 33.
132. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
133. See Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 30-31.
134. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding
that equal protection clause protected African-Americans from discrimination in res-
taurant that rented space from a building funded by public entity); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that city's change in boundaries was uncon-
stitutional insofar as it eliminated the vast majority of African-American voters).
135. HOLE & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 18-19.
136. Maternal custody of children of tender years, for example, was presumed to be
in the best interest of the child. See BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 26. Alimony
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Murray carefully avoided any suggestion that going to the
Supreme Court to enforce equality between the sexes would
mean the fall of all sex-specific labor or family laws. She ana-
lyzed Muller in a respectful manner, giving it a narrow reading:
the Oregon statute setting maximum hours for women in certain
industries was constitutional because of "(1) the relation of
woman's health needs to her maternal functions and the public
interest in preserving 'the strength and vigor of the race,' and
(2) the necessity for some protective legislation for women 'to
secure an equality of right' in the unequal struggle for subsis-
tence."137 Murray stressed that "[t]he Court made it clear, how-
ever, that the purpose of the legislation was 'to compensate for
some of the burdens which rest upon' women and which prevent
them from asserting their 'full rights.""38 Murray argued that
subsequent cases-upholding all sorts of discriminatory legisla-
tion on the ground that Muller v. Oregon recognized any and
every classification by sex as constitutional-had misunderstood
the "principles of that case."139
Murray suggested that the Supreme Court could develop a
norm that would strike the bad sex-based classifications and
uphold the good:
Where a statute or practice applies differential treatment to
women as a class, it is based upon a reasonable classification
if, and only if,
1. It is designed to protect the maternal and family func-
tions through compensatory measures and is limited in
operation to that class of women who perform these func-
tions; or
was also something ex-husbands paid to ex-wives after divorce. See id. For a general
description of sex-specific rules at this time, see id. at 25-27.
137. Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 13-14.
138. Id. at 14.
139. Id. at 15. Murray criticized Muller v. Oregon's application to jury exclusion in
Commonwealth v. Welosky, 177 N.E. 656 (Mass. 1931); to differential treatment in
the licensing of certain occupations in Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912)
and People v. Case, 116 N.W. 558, 560 (Mich. 1908); and to the exclusion of women
from a state-supported university in State v. Hunter, 300 P.2d 455, 458 (Or. 1956),
Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), and Heaton v. Bristol, 317
S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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2. It is a valid health regulation designed to protect any
special health needs which, on the basis of the most ad-
vanced findings of medical science, women are shown to
have and men not to have; or
3. It is designed to protect an equality of right which wom-
en, because of their traditionally disadvantaged position in
society, themselves have been unable to assert adequately
both at the time of the law and at the time the law is ap-
plied; and
4. The differential treatment does not imply inferiority or
enforce an inferior status by singling women out as a class
for restrictive treatment.
A governmental policy differentiating between men and wom-
en which does not meet these criteria is based upon a classifi-
cation of sex per se and is arbitrary and unreasonable within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."4
Murray gave a few examples: A legislature might reasonably
distinguish between mothers with custody of children under six-
teen and other women and men or, in order to protect future
mothers, between women of child-bearing age and other wom-
en,' but it would not be reasonable to include women over the
age of forty-five in a classification designed to protect prospec-
tive mothers;" nor would it be reasonable to assume that all
women are dependent on men, given that "20% of the female
population is single, when women constitute 30% of the labor
force, 10% of responsible heads of families, and outnumber the
male population by nearly 4,000,000, in addition to having a life
expectancy of five to seven years longer than the male."'
Murray explained why a case-by-case approach would be supe-
rior to an ERA:
Thus, instead of a mechanistic application of the doctrine of
sex as a basis of legislative classification on the one hand or
140. Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 17.
141. See id. at 17-18.
142. See id. at 18.
143. Id.
1998] 227
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
a denial that in some instances such classification may have
a valid functional basis, the development of standards in a
case-by-case approach provides the flexibility which permits
the evolution of a more realistic application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect both the maternal and family func-
tions and the right of women to full human development.'"
Marguerite Rawalt and other ERA advocates had argued that
judges were almost all male and had not recently indicated
much commitment to recognizing women's rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.'45 Murray responded that there had
been
no concerted effort to bring to bear upon the courts the body
of current knowledge about the capacities, achievements and
perspectives of women as individuals nor of the social impli-
cations of legal discrimination against them. No equivalent of
the school desegregation cases, Brown v. Board of Education,
has been presented to the Supreme Court which addresses
itself to the psychological aspects of discrimination against
women, nor, within this framework, to the concept of equality
in contemporary society.'46
Murray concluded by restating her suggested criteria:
Obviously, not every law or regulation which affects the sta-
tus of women is discriminatory. Protective and social labor
legislation has been extended generally to male workers and
represents enlightened social policy. Family support laws and
social insurance provisions related to the family function are
also socially desirable as compensation for the special servic-
es which women render to society. Restrictions on the em-
ployment of women in certain occupations may have valid
health reasons or may forecast a general humane social de-
velopment. Differential treatment for female offenders has
been upheld where it represented experimentation with more
enlightened penal methods. (The law which penalizes a fe-
male prostitute but imposes no penalty upon her male cus-
tomer, however, cannot be justified on any ground.)47
144. Id. at 19.
145. See id. at 19-20; PATERSON, supra note 36, at 138.
146. Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 21.
147. Id. at 28-29.
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Murray suggested challenges to the following: cases involving
exclusion of women from juries and educational institutions; the
husband's right to determine the domicile of his wife; limits on
women's ability to contract and control their wages; and cases
involving "guardianship of children, involving similar problems
arising out of marital and family relationships." "8 Murray also
proposed that advocates for women's rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment form a coalition to bring carefully selected
cases before the courts, cases presenting shocking injustices in a
manner likely to cut through judicial bias with strong appeals to
basic fairness.' Eventually, the Women's Rights Project of the
ACLU successfully implemented this approach under Ruth
Bader Ginsburg.5 '
C. The PCSW Compromise
At the March 1963 meeting of the Committee on Civil and
Political Rights, the committee "followed Marguerite's lead on
everything except the Equal Rights Amendment." 5' Murray
still favored going to the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'52 At the Committee's final meeting, they agreed
on compromise wording to be submitted to the full commission
on April 23:
In view of the promise of this constitutional approach, the
Commission does not take a position in favor of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment at this time. 5'
When the full commission met in the spring of 1963 to agree
on its final recommendations, it rejected the committee's com-
promise' and decided to take a clear position against
ERA."'55 Rawalt fought determinedly to at least avoid a vote on
148. Id. at 30.
149. See id.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 278-80.
151. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 142.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 143.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 64-70.
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the issue.15 Eventually, the commission agreed to adopt a
statement drafted by the Justice Department rather than the
one drafted by her committee. It stated:
[I]n view of the fact that a constitutional Amendment does
not appear to be necessary to establish the principle of equal-
ity, the Commission believes that constitutional changes
should not be sought unless, at some future time, it appears
from court decisions that a need for such action exists.157
Rawalt waited through hours of meetings the next day, then she
said: "'Of course after yesterday's defeat, I should be glad to see
nothing printed about what my committee did."'15 8 She asked
merely that the word "now" be added to the commission's recom-
mendation, so that it would read "the Commission believes that
constitutional changes 'need not now be sought."'159 It is this
compromise wording that appears in the final commission re-
port.1
60
On October 11, 1963, Eleanor Roosevelt's birthday but a little
over a year after her death, the PCSW presented its report to
President Kennedy. (Six weeks later he too was dead.) The re-
port offered a number of proposals for both state and federal
government, employers, foundations, and schools. 16 1 It also rec-
ommended that the President establish a Citizens Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, which Kennedy immediately
did, appointing many who had worked on the commission, in-
cluding Marguerite Rawalt
6 1
The PCSW's compromise position on ERA-proposing that
women seek equality through the courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment and suggesting that, if that failed, an ERA might be
appropriate-was an important breakthrough. Everyone agreed
on seeking equality through the courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment as the best short-term strategy.
156. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 143.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 144 (quoting Marguerite Rawalt).
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 147.
162. See id. at 147-48.
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Equally important, the PCSW brought together women lead-
ers from all over the country and created some real forward mo-
mentum on women's issues just as the second wave of the femi-
nist movement began. Betty Freidan's book, The Feminine Mys-
tique, often seen as the start of the second wave, also was pub-
lished in 1963. Suddenly, it was possible to talk about women's
issues and even to use the word "feminist."'63 Many states al-
ready had state commissions working on women's status, and
eventually every state would have such a commission (or series
of commissions)."M
Two of the PCSW's work-related proposals were adopted even
before the commission had concluded its deliberations: in 1962,
President Kennedy issued an executive order opening high-level
federal employment to women, and in 1963, Congress enacted
the Equal Pay Act.'65 The PCSW also recommended fair wage
and hours laws for all women and men, and workplace accom-
modation of the needs of all women, whether they were mothers,
married, single, young, or old.'66
At the time of the commission's report, Executive Order 10925
prohibited "discrimination based on race, creed, color, or nation-
al origin in employment under federal contracts."'67 The Com-
mission did not suggest adding "sex" to this order because of
members' continuing commitment to sex-specific protectionist
legislation. Instead, the report suggested caution: "We are aware
that this order could be expanded to forbid discrimination based
on sex. But discrimination based on sex, the Commission be-
lieves, involves problems sufficiently different from discrimina-
tion based on the other factors listed to make separate treat-
ment preferable."'68 Within a year, however, Congress enacted
Title VII, banning sex discrimination by all employers, private
as well as public, with more than twenty-five employees.'69
163. See id. at 152.
164. See id.
165. See HOLE & LEVINE, supra note 1, at 21.
166. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 147-48.
167. Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 355.
168. AMERICAN WOMEN: THE REPORT OF THE U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE
STATUS OF WOMEN AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION 48-49 (1965).
169. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 154.
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II. TITLE VII PREEMPTS PROTECTIONIST LEGISLATION
The conventional wisdom is that "sex" was added to Title ViI's
prohibition on discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, religion, national origin, or color as a joke by a southerner
hoping to derail the bill, 7 ' but the story is far more compli-
cated than that, and many women and men, eventually even the
President, worked for and supported the inclusion of "sex."
Late in 1963, Alice Paul and other members of the NWP be-
gan negotiating with Congressperson Howard Smith of Virginia,
who opposed Title VII's ban on race discrimination. 7' They
suggested that he propose an amendment adding sex to the non-
discrimination provision. The NWP hoped, of course, that the
legislation ultimately would pass with a ban on sex discrimina-
tion as well as discrimination based on race, religion, national
origin, and color. On February 8, 1964, Congressperson Smith
moved to add "sex" to Title VII and got a good laugh in doing
so. 7' Congressperson Martha Griffiths then argued in all seri-
ousness that "sex" should be added: "[A] vote against this
amendment today by a white man is a vote against his wife, or
his widow, or his daughter, or his sister" who will otherwise be
among the "white women ... last at the hiring gate." 173
Initially, the Johnson administration opposed the inclusion of
women, apparently out of fear it would derail the bill. 74 Es-
ther Peterson, still head of the Women's Bureau, also opposed
it. 17 Emmanuel Celler, who opposed the addition of sex to Ti-
tle VII just as he had opposed the ERA, read into the brief
House debate a letter from Esther Peterson that stated:
In view of [the PCSW's unwillingness to recommend the addi-
tion of sex to the Executive Order banning discrimination by
federal contractors] reached by representatives from a variety
of women's organizations and private and public agencies to
attack discriminations based on sex separately, we are of the
170. See, e.g., BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 21.
171. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 153.
172. See 110 CONG. REC. 2577-78 (statement of Rep. Smith).
173. Id. at 2578, 2580.
174. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 153.
175. See id.
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opinion that to attempt to so amend [Title VIII would not be
to the best advantage of women at this time.'76
Congressperson Edith Green of Oregon also opposed it: "It will
clutter up the bill and it may later... be used to help destroy
this section of the bill by some of the very people who today sup-
port it."'77 Everyone seemed surprised when the House passed
Title VII on February 10, 1964 with "sex" included by a vote of
290 to 130.178
When Title VII came before the Senate in the spring of 1964,
Marguerite Rawalt and Pauli Murray were among those working
hard for its passage with the sex provision. 179 Pauli Murray
stated:
[I] was overjoyed to learn of the House action, particularly
because, as a Negro woman, I knew that in many instances it
was difficult to determine whether I was being discriminated
against because of race or sex and felt that the sex provision
would close a gap in the employment rights of all Negro
women.
180
After seeing the strong support the women's amendment had
garnered in the House, even "Esther Peterson changed her posi-
tion and worked for it in the Senate." 8'
Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois, a Republican and the Sen-
ate minority leader, opposed the inclusion of "sex."'82 The net-
work of women supporting the inclusion of "sex," including Pauli
Murray and Marguerite Rawalt, was able to put pressure on
Dirksen through Illinois BPW members and Margaret Chase
Smith.'83 Dirksen relented and withdrew his opposition" at
a Senate Republican Conference, described in the words of Sena-
tor Margaret Chase Smith:
176. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (statement of Rep. Celler).
177. Id. at 2581.
178. See 110 CONG. REc. 2804-05 (1964).
179. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 153-54.
180. MURRAY, supra note 109, at 356.
181. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 154.
182. See MURRAY, supra note 109, at 356; PATERSON, supra note 36, at 154.
183. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 154.
184. See id.
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Senator Dirksen, the Republican Minority Leader upon whom
much of the fate of the Civil Rights Bill rests, originally of-
fered an amendment to strike the word "sex" from the Bill as
passed by the House. I stood up and opposed and argued
against his amendment. In doing so, I marshaled so much
Republican opposition to it that Senator Dirksen decided not
to introduce his amendment.'1
Meanwhile, Marguerite Rawalt had asked Pauli Murray to
write a memorandum to be delivered to the President via Mrs.
Johnson."6 Murray quickly prepared a "Memorandum in Sup-
port of Retaining the Amendment to [Title VII to] Prohibit Dis-
crimination in Employment Because of Sex.""8 7 Murray de-
scribed this memo as follows:
It was a strongly worded document, pointing to the historical
interrelatedness of the movements for civil rights and
women's rights and the tragic consequences in United States
history of ignoring the interrelatedness of all human rights.
It argued that the inclusion of the "sex" amendment would
strengthen the main purpose of the bill and reduce the bitter
tensions that would result from the exclusion of so large a
category as women workers. It declared: "A strong argument
can be made for the proposition that Title VII without the
'sex' amendment would benefit Negro males primarily and
thus offer genuine equality of opportunity to only half of the
potential Negro work force." A further argument was made
that the amendment would buttress the recently enacted
Equal Pay Act of 1963, and in answer to the PCSW position
that a separate program was necessary to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination against women, the memorandum as-
serted: "This view betrays an undue caution in dealing with
the near-revolutionary problem of human rights today. The
'uniqueness' of the nature of the discrimination on the basis
of sex is largely fictitious and cloaks both timidity and pater-
nalism. There are few, if any, jobs for which an employee's
sex could be considered relevant . . .
185. MURRAY, supra note 109, at 357.
186. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 154.
187. MURRAY, supra note 109, at 356.
188. Id. at 356-57.
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Pauli Murray sent a copy to Lady Bird Johnson, "asking her
to discuss the matter with the President."'89 Copies also were
distributed to other important people in Washington, including
"Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Vice-President Hubert
Humphrey, and Senators Margaret Chase Smith [and] Everett
M. Dirksen."9 °
Pauli Murray received a response from Bess Abell, Lady Bird
Johnson's social secretary, "acknowledging on her behalf my
'convincing and persuasive' memo and telling me: 'I have
checked this matter out and I am pleased to advise you that as
far as the Administration is concerned, its position is that the
Bill should be enacted in its present form.'" 9 '
Martha Griffiths also lobbied the President, sending him a
message through Liz Carpenter: "If that amendment comes out
of that bill, I will send my speech door to door in every member's
district who voted against it, and in my opinion, those who voted
against it would never return to Congress."92
On July 2, Congress enacted Title VII with the provision ban-
ning sex discrimination in private and public employment in the
United States, 93 but the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) did. nothing to enforce it for years."9 The
EEOC's recalcitrance ultimately led to the creation of the Na-
tional Organization of Women (NOW) and helped fuel the
emerging second wave of the women's movement.'95
When Title VII became effective in July of 1965, help-wanted
advertisements in newspapers routinely specified "Colored" or
"White" and "male" or "female."' The EEOC, the federal agen-
cy responsible for enforcement of Title VII, immediately targeted
racial help-wanted ads; targeted newspapers quickly agreed to
drop such labels. 97 Neither the EEOC nor the newspapers,
189. Id. at 357.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 357-58.
192. PATERSON, supra note 36, at 154.
193. See MURRAY, supra note 109, at 358.
194. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 159-60, 163-64.
195. See id. at 165-66.
196. See id. at 158-59.
197. See id. at 158.
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however, were interested in eliminating sex-specific ads. 9 ' The
newspapers joked about whether female and male ads might
discriminate on the basis of sex,'99 and the EEOC's first chair,
Franklin Roosevelt, Jr., thought that whether such ads discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex was a "tricky question.""0
By the end of 1965, Marguerite Rawalt, Pauli Murray, and
Betty Freidan, as well as many other activists, had expressed
concern about the EEOC's attitude toward Title VII's prohibition
on sex discrimination. 0 ' With the exception of the one woman
on the five-member commission, Aileen Hernandez, the EEOC
tended to regard the prohibition on sex discrimination as a
joke.20 2
By the middle of 1966, more feminists were even angrier
about the EEOC's refusal to enforce Title VII.2 3 Martha
Griffiths gave a stinging speech in the House of Representatives
shortly before a national meeting of the State Commissions on
the Status of Women.2 4 It was at a lunch connected with this
national meeting that Betty Friedan, Pauli Murray, and others
decided to form NOW.20 5 Marguerite Rawalt soon joined and
became a member of NOW's first executive board and head of its
litigation committee.0 6
Meanwhile, in California, Velma Mengelkoch, a mother sup-
porting two children, together with some other factory workers,
brought a Title VII challenge against the company's use of maxi-
mum hours limits applicable only to women in order to limit the
number of women employed and to deny them promotions." 7
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Id. NOW eventually became involved in a legal challenge to separate job
wanted ads for women and men. See id. at 187. The case involved the interpretation
of a municipal human rights ordinance worded like Title VII, and the newspaper
raised the First Amendment as a defense. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (holding that the First Amend-
ment did not bar municipal ordinance ban on sex-designated help-wanted ads).
201. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 159-60.
202. See id. at 158-60.
203. See id. at 163 (reporting that women in the NAWL, BPW, ACLU, and the
Citizens Council were all extremely upset).
204. See id. at 164.
205. See id. at 166.
206. See id. at 168.
207. See Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 956, 958 (C.D.
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Mengelkoch had not been able to hire a lawyer and felt that her
court-appointed lawyers were not doing their job.0 ' In October
of 1966, she wrote Marguerite Rawalt-because of her associa-
tion with NAWL2 9 -and asked for her help.21° Mengelkoch
eventually fired her private attorneys and NOW took over the
case.2 ' Rawalt and other members of NOW's legal committee
worked hard on this and other important challenges to protec-
tionist legislation."2
In November, Aileen Hernandez, who had been the only wom-
an on the EEOC, resigned in disgust and began to serve as Ex-
ecutive Vice President of NOW."' NOW marched on EEOC of-
fices and filed a formal complaint with the EEOC about its non-
enforcement.214
NOW grew at an amazing rate during 1967. In November, it
held its first annual convention.215 On the agenda was whether
to push for an ERA.1 6 Those opposed argued that women in
the unions needed another year; they were making progress
(presumably in eliminating the need for sex-specific protectionist
legislation).217 At least one participant argued that the ERA
did not have a chance in Congress and that NOW should concen-
trate on the courts, where there was a chance of success.1 8
Cal.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 83 (1968) (holding that plaintiffs must first seek
relief in state courts and administrative agencies before bringing a federal action);
see also PATERSON, supra note 36, at 169 (discussing NAWL involvement in
Mengelkoch litigation).
208. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 169.
209. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
210. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 169.
211. See id. at 169, 173, 178.
212. See id. at 170, 174, 178-79. NOW became involved in both Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.) (holding that Indiana law barring women
from jobs requiring lifting more than thirty-five pounds was preempted by Title VII),
opinion corrected, No. 16624, 16625, 16626, 16632, 1969 WL 4715 (7th Cir. Oct. 29,
1969) and Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969) (holding that employer failed to show that sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification for telephone "switchman" job).
213. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 170.
214. See id. at 170-71.
215. See id. at 180.
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See id.
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Although the battle over the ERA was fierce and raged for sever-
al days, in the end, "ERA was number one in NOW's 'Bill of
Rights,"' which also called for equality in employment, day care,
maternity leave, tax deductions for child care, better safety nets
for poor women, and reproductive freedom, including abortion
rights.219 Women from labor resigned from NOW's board and
others were upset about the abortion position, but the battle was
pretty much over. °
One of the major blocks to ERA support was the sex-specific
nature of family law. Marguerite Rawalt had been a member of
the Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women from its
initial creation by Kennedy immediately after the PCSW submit-
ted its report in 1963. She had become chair of the Council's
Task Force on Family Law and Policy, and in April of 1968, that
task force issued its report. The report recommended that do-
mestic relations laws be reformed to reflect the economic part-
nership of marriage, that custody in divorce cases be determined
by the best interests of the child, and that distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children be eliminated along with re-
strictions on birth control and abortion. 1
At about the same time, spring of 1969, the Citizens' Council's
Task Force on Labor Standards recommended changes to labor
laws and the reform of laws applicable only to women, changes
consistent with NOW's Bill of Rights and an ERA.222 Title VII
arguably had made sex-specific protectionist legislation illegal as
of its effective date, July 1, 1965. By late 1969, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit had held that Title VII preempted
all state protectionist legislation applicable only to women." 3
With the end of such legislation in sight-other circuits soon
219. Id.
220. See id. at 181.
221. See id. at 189. The report was documentary evidence submitted at the
Senate's ERA hearings in May of 1970. See The "Equal Rights" Amendment: Hear-
ings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 137-213 (1970) [hereinafter Hearings].
222. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 189.
223. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.) (holding that Title
VII banned disparate treatment of women and men even under protectionist legisla-
tion), opinion corrected, No. 16624, 16625, 16626, 16632, 1969 WL 4715 (7th Cir.
Oct. 29, 1969).
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would join the Seventh 2 --one of the major grounds for objec-
tion to an ERA approach disappeared. Increasing numbers of
mainstream women leaders became supporters.2" There was
now new wording for the Amendment:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be de-
nied or abridged by the United States or by any State on ac-
count of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
In Febrfiary of 1970, the Citizen's Advisory Council on the
Status of Women endorsed the ERA and urged President Nixon
to endorse it.12 7 A few days later, Marguerite Rawalt was as-
tounded to hear that Senator Birch Bayh, a Democrat from Indi-
ana and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Amendments, announced plans to hold
ERA hearings in May, the first action in Congress on the issue
in almost ten years.228 Shortly thereafter, the United Automo-
bile Workers Union became the first union to endorse the
ERA.229 The subcommittee's hearings began Tuesday, May 5,
two days after Kent State,20 and testimony overwhelmingly
ran in support of the amendmentY Opposition to the ERA at
the hearings came from some labor organizations and activists
and some Catholic and Jewish women,=2 but many other labor
unions, labor activists, and Catholic and Jewish women support-
224. See, e.g., Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Welfare, 509 F.2d 20 (9th
Cir. 1974); Kober v. Westinghouse Elec., 480 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1973); LeBlanc v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 460 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1972); Rosenfeld v. Southern
Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
225. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 201-08.
226. BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 24.
227. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 202.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Don Bauer, Kent State, 1970: The Kids Who Held The Rifles, MIAMI HER-
ALD, May 3, 1987, at 3C.
231. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 221, at 331-37, 491-98 (testimony of Gloria
Steinem and Betty Friedan).
232. See id. at 662-64 (reprinting statements of the National Council of Jewish
Women and the National Council of Catholic Women).
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ed the ERA."' There was no identifiable interest group vig-
orously and uniformly opposed to it.
Supporters argued that the ERA would do in one giant step
what would otherwise take years: eliminate all legislation dis-
criminating against women.234 They pointed to the need to
eliminate sex-specific protectionist legislation, which often hurt
women and was no longer necessary to prevent sweat shops; 5
to give married women in all states full rights to contract and to
own property;23 to gain equal access to public education; 7 to
serve on juries under the same rules applicable to men;238 to
equalize age of majority and of ability to marry for women and
men;23 s to equalize dower and courtesy rights on death of a
spouse;40 to eliminate the rule that the husband, as head of
the family, determines the family's domicile; ' to ensure equal-
ity in military service;242 and to equalize the benefits and bur-
dens on women and men as citizens, wives and husbands, and
233. See, e.g., id. at 457-59, 619-20, 671-73 (statements of Stanley J. McFarland,
Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Federal Relations of the National Education
Association, the B'nai Brith Women, and St. Joan's Alliance).
234. See id. at 7-8 (statement of Hon. Eugene J. McCarthy, U.S. Senator from the
State of Minnesota).
235. See id. at 10-12 (statement of Mrs. Myra Ruth Harmon, President, the Nation-
al Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs, Inc.).
236. See id. at 3 (statement of Senator Bayh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary).
237. See id. at 412-15 (statement of Dr. Bernice Sandler, Women's Equity Action
League).
238. See id. at 499-500 (statement of Mrs. Adele T. Weaver, President-Elect, Na-
tional Association of Women Lawyers). Although women were permitted to serve on
juries in all states at the time of the hearings, some states automatically excused
mothers of small children. Cf. Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amend-
ments: Making a Difference or Making a Statement, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 907, 938
(1997) (discussing state court disagreement on constitutionality of laws or regulations
that automatically excused women if they were needed to take care of minor chil-
dren).
239. See Hearings, supra note 221, at 500 (statement of Mrs. Adele T. Weaver,
President-Elect, National Association of Women Lawyers).
240. See id. at 501 (statement of Mrs. Adele T. Weaver, President-Elect, National
Association of Women Lawyers).
241. See id. at 501-02 (statement of Mrs. Adele T. Weaver, President-Elect, Nation-
al Association of Women Lawyers).
242. See id. at 504 (advocating service for young women as well as young men, but
avoiding any suggestion that women would serve in combat: "there are thousands of
activities by which our young military female could give service to her country").
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mothers and fathers. As one supporter succinctly explained,
"[mien and women should share alike in the full range of family,
economic, and political responsibilities."243 In short, supporters
argued that the ERA would strike down countless laws "still on
the books that deny more than half our population the right of
first-class citizenship." 4
Radical women, like most other women concerned with
women's status, did not oppose the ERA, though they did stress
that it was likely to be ineffective. For example, three radical
women from the Washington D.C. Women's Liberation testified
at the Senate subcommittee hearings using the names Emma
Goldman, Sarah Grimke, and Angelina Grimke.245 Their testi-
mony was clearly radical-but ambiguous on the ERA. Sarah
Grimke spoke first:
We have come here today to support our sisters who have
been working since 1923 for the passage of this amendment
to guarantee equal constitutional rights. At the same time we
recognize the fears of working women that an equal rights
amendment may be used exploitatively against us rather
than to guarantee rights. Equal rights under the law will
give women the confidence to struggle further for liberation.
The nature of the male supremacist system which viciously
discriminates against women in all levels of our society will
be exposed. No women could be against equality under the
law, but we know that the amendment cannot guarantee real
equality.... We know, moreover, that the Constitution was
written to protect the privilege and status of white men. We
do not come here to ask for our freedom. We are going to take
it. It is rightfully ours. As was said more than 100 years ago,
I ask no favors for my sex. I surrender not our claim to
equality. All I ask our brethren is that they will take their
feet from off our necks and permit us to stand upright on the
ground on which God has designed us to occupy.246
243. Id. at 518 (statement of Virginia R. Allan, Chairman, President's Task Force
on Women's Rights and Responsibilities).
244. Id. at 1 (statement of Senator Bayh, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutional Amendments of the Committee on the Judiciary).
245. See id. at 78 (statement of Emma Goldman, Women's Liberation, Washington
D.C., accompanied by Sarah Grimke and Angelina Grimke).
246. Id. at 78. Goldman incorporated Sarah Grimke's 1837 statement: "I ask no fa-
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Emma Goldman's testimony also was ambiguous with respect to
her substantive position on the ERA:
These hearings are being held at a time when it is obvious
that women are standing up for their rights. We know that
this amendment will be passed by Congress in a vain attempt
to absorb the growing pressure exerted by women in their
own behalf. The liberation of women has become the issue of
the 1970s. The mass media-television, comic strips, maga-
zines from the Atlantic Monthly to Family Circle-has dis-
torted, manipulated and exploited the women's movement.
And now the U.S. Congress, close on the heels of Playboy
Magazine, manifests its blatant hypocrisy by frantically
searching for a way to co-opt a growing women's revolution.
We are aware the system will try to appease with their paper
offerings. We will not be appeased! Our demands can only be
met by a total transformation of society which you cannot
legislate, you cannot co-opt, you cannot control. The struggle
belongs to the people.247
The third radical, Angelina Grimke, then announced that their
testimony was over and the three turned their backs on the Sen-
ators so that Angelina Grimke could speak directly to the people
in the room.24 She too noted the inadequacies of the amend-
ment, but did not explicitly oppose it:
The amendment will place equal responsibility on men and
women for alimony, divorce, and child custody. But it does
not deal with the reasons for failed marriages: the nuclear
family which cannot meet human emotional needs. The nu-
clear family which is an isolated unit of the husband, wife
and children, in this society takes no responsibility for chil-
dren. We must, all of us, men and women, take up this re-
sponsibility. We are experimenting in new forms of coopera-
tive and communal living. We are working to provide free 24-
hour a day child care, community controlled.... They offer
vors for my sex .... All I ask of our brethren is, that they will take their feet from
off our necks .... ." SARAH GRIMKE, LETTERS ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND
THE CONDITION OF WOMAN: ADDRESSED TO MARY S. PARKER, PRESIDENT OF THE
BOSTON FEMALE ANTI-SLAVERY SocIETY 10 (1970).
247. Hearings, supra note 221, at 78-79.
248. See id. at 79.
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us an equal chance to kill and to die for the U.S. imperialism.
We oppose the draft for both men and women. But like our
sisters in Vietnam and Cambodia, we will fight for the libera-
tion of oppressed peoples wherever we are.... Constitutional
amendments will not make any difference to [education,
health care, "justice" in the criminal justice system], only rev-
olutionary change can meet the demands that women are
making today. Free our sisters, free ourselves, all power to
the people.2 9
With that, the radicals swept out of the hearing room, leaving
Senator Cook fussing about their rudeness and Senator Bayh
regretting that he had not been able to question them about
their substantive position."' Bayh could not figure out whether
they supported or opposed the ERA."S
More analytical critiques of the ERA were presented at the
May 1971 Senate subcommittee hearings, but they were few in
number. As mentioned earlier, representatives from labor orga-
nizations were split. 2 Testimony included that the ERA would
destroy needed protectionist labor legislation applicable to wom-
en" and that protectionist legislation was used by employers
to keep women in low-paying jobs.' Union opponents of the
ERA argued that the EEOC regulation went too far in eliminat-
ing all protectionist legislation and urged the EEOC, courts, and
legislatures to reconcile the conflicts between laws that discrimi-
nated against women and protectionist legislation applicable
only to women."s Union supporters of the ERA argued that
protectionist legislation applicable only to women already was
illegal under Title VII's language, EEOC regulations, and judi-
cial decisions to dateY6
249. Id. at 79.
250. See id. at 80.
251. See id. at 80-81.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 229 and 232.
253. See id at 81 (statement of Mortimer Furay, Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO
Council).
254. See id. at 575-78 (statement of Georgianna Sellers, Acting Chairman of the
Indiana and Kentucky Unit of the League for American Working Women); id. at
592-94 (statement of Olga M. Madar, Vice President of the United Auto Workers).
255. See id. at 467-68 (statement of AFL-CIO in opposition to ERA).
256. See id. at 575-92 (statement of Georgianna Sellers, Acting Chairman of the
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Opponents from organized labor stressed the importance and
value to women of protectionist legislation applicable only to
women,25 ' but opponents also expressed other concerns. One
was that the ERA actually could do little; that what was needed
was detailed specific legislation designed to address specific
problems.258 Both the National Councils of Jewish Women and
of Catholic Women expressed concern that the ERA would elimi-
nate existing family support laws that obligated men to support
their families.259 The National Council of Jewish Women ar-
gued that most sex-specific laws dealt with personal and family
relationships and concluded: "It is very doubtful that the ma-
jority of the women in the United States would agree that a
family support law is a curtailment of their rights."5 0 The Na-
tional Council of Jewish Women noted that ERA proponents
were overwhelmingly elite professional women, economically
independent and therefore without any need for family sup-
port.261 The council stressed the ERA's vagueness and the un-
certainty of what courts would do with it: "Since it is impossible
to predict how a given court will interpret a given constitutional
amendment, the proponents are not really assured of the objec-
tive they seek, that is, identity of treatment."262
The two most contested areas were sex-specific protectionist
labor laws and family legislation. With respect to protectionist
legislation, the disagreement was both normative and empirical:
(1) whether different rules should apply to women and men in
employment given women's reproductive role, domestic responsi-
bilities, as well as physical differences between the sexes; and
(2) whether protectionist legislation on the books in 1970 helped
or hurt women workers.
Indiana and Kentucky Unit of the League for American Working Women); id. at 594
(statement of Olga M. Madar, Vice President of the United Auto Workers).
257. See, e.g., id. at 81-82 (statement of Mortimer Furay, Metropolitan Detroit AFL-
CIO).
258. See id. at 619 (statement of Jacob S. Potofsky, General President, Amalgamat-
ed Clothing Workers of America).
259. See id. at 662-64 (statements of the National Council of Jewish Women and
the National Council of Catholic Women).
260. Id. at 663 (statement of the National Council of Jewish Women).
261. See id.
262. Id. at 664.
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With respect to family law rules in general, disagreement
tended not to focus on the normative question of whether cur-
rent sex-specific rules were ideal, which they clearly were not,
but on the consequences of eliminating current laws. Supporters
of the ERA believed that condescending and sexist family law
rules would be replaced by sex-neutral rules recognizing the val-
ue of homemakers' contributions and protecting children and
caretakers in a more equitable and less sexist manner.263 Op-
ponents were concerned about eliminating sex-specific family
law rules without knowing more.2"
On child custody, even ERA supporters seem to have dis-
agreed on the content of laws under the ERA. For example,
Adele Weaver, President-Elect of the NAWL, testified that the
ERA would not, in her opinion, have any effect "upon the exist-
ing law and practice" that based custody on the child's best in-
terests with a presumption in many jurisdictions that "the best
interests of a child of tender years are served by granting custo-
263. See id. at 502-03 (statement of Mrs. Adele T. Weaver, President-Elect, Nation-
al Association of Women Lawyers). Weaver noted that:
While the amendment would make unconstitutional the award of alimony
to a wife based simply on the ground of sex there would be no deterrent
to an award of alimony on grounds such as the following: the wife's fi-
nancial contributions or their equivalent in homemaking services to the
marriage partnership, the years of duration of the marriage, the need for
support based on the inability to be self-supporting, age, lack of educa-
tion or training, lack of availability or need for the services that the de-
pendent spouse is capable of performing.
Id. at 503. Rawalt quoted with approval from the Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women's Task Force on Family recommendations on property rights:
Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse make [sic] a different
but equally important contribution is increasingly recognized as a reality
in this country and is already reflected in the laws of some other
countries. During marriage, each spouse should have a legally defined
substantial right in the earnings of the other, in the real and personal
property acquired through these earnings, and in their management.
Such a right should be legally recognized as surviving the marriage in
the event of its termination by divorce, annulment, or death. Appropriate
legislation should safeguard either spouse and protect the surviving
spouse against improper alienation of property by the other. Surviving
children as well . . . should be protected from disinheritance.").
Id. at 724 (Memorandum by Marguerite Rawalt on married women and propeity).
264. See id. at 663 (statement of the National Council of Jewish Women in Opposi-
tion).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
dy to the mother."265 In contrast, as noted earlier, the Citizen's
Advisory Council's Task Force on Family Law and Policy,
chaired by Rawalt, came out in support of the ERA, recommend-
ing the elimination of the maternal preference for children of
tender age.266 Opponents objected generally to the elimination
of all sex-specific rules in family law, noting the great uncer-
tainty as to how courts would interpret so vague a standard, but
did not explicitly address custody standards.267
Opposition was minimal at the hearings. The greater depth of
the analysis of proponents was a tactical advantage and the in-
evitable result of the fact that few organized groups still were
opposed to the ERA. The hearings were an ERA rally, with the
audience hissing opponents 268 and applauding supporters.269
The vast majority of those testifying or submitting statements
supported the ERA.
Momentum continued to build after the Senate subcommittee
hearing. In June, the Women's Bureau convinced the Labor De-
partment to reverse its long-standing position and to endorse the
ERA. ° In August, the ERA passed the House, and in Febru-
ary, the Senate.2"' Its momentum seemed unstoppable. On that
same day, the Hawaii legislature ratified the amendment and
within two days, five more states had ratified it.272 By the end
of 1973, thirty states had ratified it,27 but opposition began
building at this point, and four years later, only five more states
had ratified the amendment for a total of thirty-five . 4 No
265. Id. at 504 (statement of Mrs. Adele T. Weaver, President-Elect, National Asso-
ciation of Women Lawyers).
266. See id. at 137 (Report of the Task Force on Family Law and Policy).
267. See id. at 662-64 (statements of the National Council of Jewish Women and
the National Council of Catholic Women).
268. See id. at 54 (statement of Mortimer Furay, Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO
Council). Senator Bayh interrupted Mr. Furay, the first opponent of ERA to testify,
and asked for courtesy. See id.
269. See id. at 491, 495 (noting applause for the statements of Betty Friedan).
270. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 207.
271. See id. at 209, 226.
272. See id. at 227; Allison L. Held et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the
ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 113, 116 (1997).
273. See Held et al., supra note 272, at 116.
274. See id.
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state ratified it thereafter and by 1982 the period of ratification
had expired despite the efforts by feminists in campaigns in
state after state.275
Opposition mounted for two reasons, both connected to the
Supreme Court. Most important was the Supreme Court's 1973
decision in Roe v. Wade, holding that women had an absolute
constitutional right to an abortion during the early stages of
pregnancy.276 Abortion opponents immediately began to mobi-
lize. These new activists tended to oppose not just abortion
rights but charnges in the status of women, including the
ERA.
2 77
The other difficulty was the success of Pauli Murray's idea:
going to the courts for equality on the basis of sex under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. In 1971, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg won the first of these cases for the Women's
Rights Project in Reed v. Reed.2 78 The Supreme Court held
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment a state stat-
ute preferring men over women for appointments as executors of
the estates of deceased relatives.279 Another such case was de-
cided in 1973, two more in 1974, four in 1975, and so on.' As
the Supreme Court struck much sex-specific legislation, it be-
came harder and harder to argue that the ERA would make any
difference outside the most controversial areas, such as the mili-
tary and bathrooms.
A. Understanding the Shift
The sixties shift was virtually inevitable. Many sex-specific
rules obviously were bad for women. For example, one of the
earliest challenges to protectionist legislation was brought by
Velma Mengelkoch, whose employer used state hours limits on
275. See PATERSON, supra note 36, at 238.
276. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
277. See Elizabeth Pleck, Failed Strategies; Renewed Hope, in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE:
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE ERA 106, 110 (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986).
278. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
279. See id. at 71-72, 77.
280. See Appendix A (listing cases won and lost on equal protection grounds).
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women's employment to justify limiting positions and promo-
tions open to women.2"'
Even when sex-specific legislation was arguably good for wom-
en, such as family support laws obligating husbands to support
their wives and children, it often was unnecessary, condescend-
ing, and demeaning. For example, women's right to support was
justified not by women's contributions and domestic and repro-
ductive labor during marriage, but by women's need and inabili-
ty to support themselves.282 The Task Force on Family Law
recommended instead a partnership view of marriage, in which
the breadwinner and homemaker would be seen as equal part-
ners contributing in different but equivalent ways to the marital
community.28
One of the traditional justifications for women's status was
that women were not capable of assuming all of the rights and
responsibilities of full citizenship.2" Feminists in the sixties
naturally reacted by asserting that women, like men, should be
liable for support of a dependent homemaker after divorce and
for support of children.285
There also was the need to end stalemate and create some
momentum for change in women's status. Feminists felt the real
and pressing need of going forward on a common agenda rather
than continuing to sit in the same places on the ERA checker-
board. Without unification behind a formal equality approach,
some of the progress enjoyed today might never have occurred.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, feminists in the sixties
could not foresee the future. At the time feminists agreed on a
formal equality approach (both an ERA and the Murray strate-
gy, arguing for sex equality under the Fourteenth Amendment),
all the race cases had been clearly and undeniably good for Afri-
can-Americans."6 Those cases had helped dismantle Jim Crow.
281. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
282. See, e.g., Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l Hosp., 303 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Va.
1983).
283. See Hearings, supra note 221, at 137, 146-51 (report of the Task Force on
Family Law and Policy).
284. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 140 (1872) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (stating that "a married woman is incapable, without her husband's con-
sent, of making contract which shall be binding on her or him").
285. See William E. Nelson, Patriarchy or Equality: Family Values or Individuality,
70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 435, 525 (1996).
286. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (holding statute pro-
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There had, as yet, been no affirmative action cases. The major
problems now seen with formal equality, particularly the doubt-
ful constitutionality of almost any affirmative action,287 were
not even blips on feminist radar screens.
The PCSW fight over whether to go for an ERA or seek equal-
ity under the Fourteenth Amendment is a telling example of the
inability to foresee the future. These were viewed as quite differ-
ent approaches. The ERA would strike all sex-specific statutes
and rules, whereas the Supreme Court interpreting the equality
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment would be able to devel-
op a more flexible approach, striking the bad and keeping the
good. It would, however, be difficult to reconcile the twenty-nine
Supreme Court constitutional sex-discrimination cases decided
under the Murray strategy in terms of the flexible standards she
suggested the Court could and would develop in her influential
memorandum.s"
The Court has been hostile to sex-specific laws reinforcing
traditional sex roles and stereotypes in family law, though some
of these laws arguably protect "maternal and family functions"
of women, and Murray's memo predicted that laws protecting
"maternal and family functions" could survive scrutiny under
the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Over the years, the Supreme
Court has decided ten sex discrimination cases under the Four-
teenth Amendment in which the need to protect the maternal
and family functions of women arguably justified the discrimina-
tion."' This justification was successful in five cases, but two
involved temporary social security provisions and two involved
immigration provisions."' Only one involved a rule likely to af-
hibiting inter-racial couples from "habitually liv[ing] in and occupy[ing] in the night-
time the same room" unconstitutional); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 156-57
(1964) (holding that health regulations mandating separate bathroom facilities for
each race violated Equal Protection Clause).
287. See, e.g., Jim Chin, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1854-55
(1996).
288. See Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 17.
289. Id. at 19.
290. See Appendix A (listing cases in which the protection of maternal and family
functions was relevant).
291. See Appendix B (listing those cases in which the outcome is consistent with
the "maternal and family function" argument). Even at the time of the decisions, the
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fect permanently many people living within the United States,
and whether that 1974 case would come out the same way if it
were litigated today is very questionable. The current Supreme
Court might well hold that a state cannot give an automatic
$500 per year property tax exemption for widows without also
giving one to widowers.292 Moreover, the Court has never sug-
gested that legislation applicable only to women will withstand
scrutiny if it meets the requirements outlined in Murray's mem-
orandum, that is, if it is a "compensatory measure" protecting
"maternal and family functions," limited in its operation to "that
class of women who perform these functions," and "does not im-
ply inferiority."29 As a result, courts have struck virtually all
sex-specific family-related legislation as inconsistent with the
Fourteenth Amendment.2" The Murray strategy of litigating
under the Fourteenth Amendment has been more similar to an
ERA approach in its results in family-related areas than femi-
nists in the sixties predicted.
In a 1971 speech given just prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Reed, Ruth Bader Ginsburg predicted another difference
between suspect class treatment under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and an ERA approach. Discussing how the ERA would
"affect men," Ginsburg stated:
While the equal rights amendment has been supported prin-
cipally by women, it is at least arguable that the right of men
to equal protection will be better secured by the equal rights
amendment than it is under the existing equal protection of
the laws guarantee. Supporters of the amendment maintain
that it declares sex a prohibited classification, not merely a
Social Security Act had been amended to eliminate the distinction at some point in
the recent past or near future. See id.
292. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 (1974) (allowing the state of Florida to
grant a $500 property tax exemption to widows, but not widowers).
293. Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 17.
294. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-83 (1979) (holding alimony statute pro-
viding only for payments from ex-husbands to ex-wives unconstitutional); Ex parte
Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695-96 (Ala. 1981) (holding tender-years presumption of ma-
ternal custody inconsistent with the equality standard in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d
117, 119 (Utah 1986) (holding fhaternal preference unconstitutional under federal
and state constitutions).
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suspect classification. With few exceptions relating to person-
al privacy and physical characteristics unique to one sex, the
constitutional mandate would be absolute if the amendment
is adopted. Suspect classification, on the other hand, relates
to the group that has borne the stigma of inferiority or sec-
ond class treatment; it has not been used to shield the
culture's dominant group from discrimination. Accordingly,
the female sex could be aided by the suspect classification
doctrine, while non-suspect status would be the lot of men.
Thus laws discriminating against women might be subject to
rigid scrutiny, while a disadvantage imposed by law on men
would pAss muster if supportable on any rational ground. A
case considered by the Supreme Court last term suggests this
differential. In Williams v. McNair, men sought admission to
a women's college that was part of the state university sys-
tem of South Carolina. A three-judge court dismissed the case
finding that .the exclusion of men was "not without any ratio-
nal justification." The Supreme Court affirmed without hear-
ing argument and without opinion.29
In this speech, Ginsburg indicated that men would be able to
challenge sex discrimination under the ERA but not under sus-
pect class analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.296 As things
have worked out, men have been able to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to challenge sex-based classifications... just as
295. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection: Men and Women as Vic-
tims, 11 J. FAm. L. 347, 361-62 (1971) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Sex
and Unequal Protection]. In the footnote to Williams v. McNair, Ginsburg follows the
cite to that case with: "But cf Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Vir-
ginia, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970) (three-judge court) (women entitled to equal
access with men to state university's 'prestige' college)." Id. at 362 n.51. In light of
this 1971 statement, it is interesting to speculate'about what difference Ginsburg
thinks strict scrutiny for sex would make in actual cases. The distinction described
in the text cannot be it, because men have been able to use suspect class arguments
since 1975. See Appendix A. Perhaps suspect class analysis would result in automat-
ic unconstitutionality of all sex-based classifications, whereas some do survive under
the current standard (intermediate scrutiny). It is difficult to imagine a sex-based
classification Ginsburg would uphold under any standard. For example, Ginsburg op-
poses advantageous treatment of pregnant workers because such treatment is ulti-
mately likely to hurt women. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Roundtable Discussion:
Where Do We Go From Here?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 1107, 1110-11 (1985) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, Roundtable Discussion].
296. See Ginsburg, Sex and Unequal Protection, supra note 295, at 361-62.
297. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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whites, in post-1971 cases, have been able to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to challenge racial classifications.29 Indeed, most
of the Supreme Court's sex discrimination cases under the Four-
teenth Amendment have been brought by men. 9
As discussed in the next section, many of the problems that
have arisen under the Supreme Court's formal equality ap-
proach are the direct result of men successfully arguing that
they were discriminated against by sex-based classifications.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the person heading the litigation drive
under the Murray strategy, did not foresee these results even
after the drive was underway.
III. THE VIEW FROM 1998
Women's lives have improved in many ways as a result of the
formal equality focus of the 1970s. Most sex-specific rules, many
of which were only harmful to women, have been eliminated in
family law, social security, dependents benefits for military per-
sonnel, and most employment. The military academies are now
open to women, and women can serve in more military positions
than in earlier eras, though they remain excluded from many
positions, including combat. Employers no longer openly refuse
to hire or promote women and women's labor force participation
rates have sky-rocketed."9 ' Most mothers with children under
the age of six work in the wage-labor market, though many
work part-time.3 ' Women are present in legislative bodies and
elective office in far greater numbers than they were thirty
years ago.302 Despite much continuing overt discrimination in
sports, girls today are far more likely to participate in team
sports than were girls thirty years ago, and female players at all
levels have many more opportunities than women had in the
298. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
299. See Appendix A.
300. See ARLIE HOSHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFr 2 (1989). See generally Gains for
Working Women, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 8, 1998, at 20, available in 1998 WL
2365097 (discussing "[tihe progress American women have made toward gender
equality over the past 25 years" in the employment arena).
301. See Gains for Working Women, supra note 300, at 20.
302. See, e.g., Lucy Soto, Women Converge on Capitol: Groups Preparing for Calen-
dar Full of Vital Legislation, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 11, 1997, at D04, available in
1997 WL 3948598 (discussing percentage of women holding public office in Georgia).
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past.303
We are, however, far from equality. The wage gap, though
narrower, persists. For full-time year round workers, on aver-
age, a woman worker earned 71.4% of what a male worker
earned in 1995 (as opposed to 58.9% in 1977). °4 In that same
year, African-American women earned 64.2% of what white men
earned and Hispanic women earned 53.4%.3°5 Most Americans
continue to work at sex-segregated jobs: jobs held, at their
workplace, either by only women or by only men. °6 Men still
hold most of the top jobs.0 7 Women continue to be primarily
responsible for the "second shift" when both parents work for
wages outside the home. 8 Violence against women continues
to be widespread, and women are still disbelieved when they
complain of abuse or violence by men they know.0 9 Women
and younger girls are taught to gauge their self worth by
their ability to present themselves as objects attractive to
men.310 Women still are overtly excluded from clerical or rab-
binical positions in many mainstream religions and from partici-
pation in many sports, including most professional team sports.
The media also continue to present women and men quite
differently.
Despite the fact that most voters are women,31' women in
1998 hold only 11.5% of the seats in the House of Representa-
tives and 9% of the seats in the Senate.1 2 Women hold 21.6%
303. See Richard S. Clayton, Female Athletes Find Popularity Soars, SEArrLE
TIMES, July 26, 1998, at D2, available in 1998 WL 3163874 ("[N]early a third of
U.S. girls play sports in high school-a seven-fold increase since 1972.").
304. See The Wage Gap: Women's and Men's Earnings (visited Mar. 25, 1998)
<http:J/www.iwpr.org/wagegap>.
305. See id.
306. See Rhonda Jennings Blackburn, Comparable Worth and the Fair Pay Act of
1994, 84 KY. L.J. 1277, 1279 (1995-1996).
307. For information on the "glass ceiling," see The Glass Ceiling Commission (visit-
ed Mar. 25, 1998) <http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/lib/bookshelf/e.-archive/GlassCeiling>.
308. See HOSHSCHILD, supra note 300, at 6-7.
309. See, e.g., Ugly Truth, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 17, 1997, at A8, available in
1997 WL 15236516.
310. See JOAN JACOBS BRUMBERG, THE BODY PROJECT. AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN GERLS xvii-xxxii (1997).
311. In the 1996 presidential election, for example, 56.1 million women and 48.9
million men reported voting. See Center for the American Woman and Politics, Sex
Differences in Voter Turnout (visited May 2, 1998) <http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/-cawp/
sexdiff.html>. Women were 53.4% of voters in that election.
312. See Center for the American Woman and Politics, Fact Sheets (visited Mar. 26,
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of the positions in state legislatures. 13
Although women continue to be primary caretakers for most
children, even when working full-time, women are at greater
risk today than thirty years ago of losing custody at divorce if
the husband fights for it. Furthermore, women often end up in
poverty when they do get custody upon divorce. Long-term
homemakers are less likely than they were thirty years ago to
get permanent maintenance. Feminists who supported formal
equality at the end of the sixties and during the seventies be-
lieved that if women bore their share of economic responsibility
for children and families, men would bear their share of domes-
tic and caretaking work in households with two working par-
ents. Many feminists thought it appropriate, therefore, that nei-
ther parent have an autonomic edge for custody at divorce, as
did the Taskforce on Family Law chaired by Marguerite
Rawalt 14 Men have not, however, assumed equal caretaking
responsibility in households with two working parents. Instead,
women are working a double-shift. A recent empirical study of
family life and political activity finds that "domestic inequalities
do have implications for political activity."315 Husbands are ad-
vantaged by their "control over major financial decisions and
autonomy in using small amounts of time."316
Understandably, men are the obstacle to equality in the home.
Roberta Sigel's Ambition and Accommodation provides an illus-
tration. In a study of men and women in New Jersey using both
telephone surveys and focus groups, she reported that men are
generally aware of women's distress over continuing domestic
gender inequities, but "consider it a fact of life which does not
engage their interest, let alone their commitment."317
1998) <http://www.rci.rutgers.edu-cawp/Cawpfs.html>.
313. See id.
314. See Hearings, supra note 221, at 137, 167 (Report of the Task Force on Fami-
ly Law and Policy).
315. Nancy Burns et al., The Public Consequences of Private Inequality: Family Life
and Citizen Participation, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 373, 373 (1997).
316. Id.
317. ROBERTA S. SEIGEL, AMBITION & ACCOMMODATION: HOW WOMEN VIEw GENDER
RELATIONS 143 (1996).
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In the all-male or all-female focus groups in Siegel's study, the
moderator began by discussing some neutral topic. In the all-
women groups, the moderator never had to raise the topic of
gender relations because "it arose spontaneously."318 In the
male groups, "the moderator was always the one to bring it up;
nor did men show much inclination to linger over this topic." 19
One of the women's major complaints was the "inequitable divi-
sion of labor in the household."32 For most men in the focus
groups, the second shift was a nonproblem.3 2' Although the
"women related that the uneven division-of-labor [at home] was
becoming a source of conflict between men and women," the
male focus groups failed "to discuss the topic at even moderate
length."322 Male telephone respondents were asked specific
questions."s Although over two-thirds of the men surveyed in
telephone interviews believed domestic labor should be evenly
divided when both parents worked, only 14% of the men thought
that equal sharing actually takes place.3"
Arlie Hochschild's The Second Shift provides additional evi-
dence. In this study of couples in the San Francisco bay area
with two working parents and a child or children under six,
Hochschild found little ideological commitment to equality be-
tween the sexes in working-class families.3" In the middle and
upper class families, there was an overt commitment to equality
in domestic responsibilities, but often that was interpreted as
his being responsible for (for example) the garage and the dog
while she was responsible for everything else. 6 Men routinely
came home and rested or engaged in hobbies while their wives
worked the second shift. 7 Hochschild found that, on average,
the women in the families she studied worked an extra month a
318. Id. at 38.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 167.
321. See id.
322. Id.
323. See id. at 168.
324. See id.
325. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 300, at 128.
326. See id. at 43-44.
327. See id. at 7.
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year. 3 8 In addition, women generally are more committed to
equality in intimate relationships than are men.1
2 9
A related problem with respect to family law issues is that
specific rules have not been replaced with ideal nonsexist rules
applied in a non-biased fashion. The maternal preference, the
presumption that a child of tender years will be best off in the
custody of her or his mother, has been formally eliminated and
replaced by either the best interests standard (most jurisdic-
tions) 33° or a primary caretaker standard (West Virginia).3 31
Mothers, however, are routinely disadvantaged in custody fights
under the best interests standard because of judicial double
standards and because they have been their children's primary
caretakers.3 2 We all expect more of mothers than fathers;
judges share this bias. In addition, a parent who has been a
primary caretaker faces many disadvantages in a custody fight
under the best interests standard. Perhaps most importantly,
she is likely to have less money to litigate and to hire ex-
perts. 3 Many factors taken into account under the best inter-
ests standard also will cut against her: economic stability and
strength, possibility of remarriage with a stay-at-home
homemaker,334  and quality of schools.335  These problems
could have been avoided had judges and legislatures adopted a
better sex-neutral rule, such as the West Virginia primary care-
taker standard, and applied it in a fair and unbiased fashion.
That has not happened.
328. See id. at 3.
329. This is true for women regardless of sexual orientation. Thus, women who
have another woman as their partner are more likely to enjoy an equitable division
of domestic responsibilities. See Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orienta-
tion, 8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165, 206 (1998).
330. See, e.g., Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A-2d 556, 577 (N.J. 1997) (quoting In re
Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1263 (N.J. 1988)).
331. See, e.g., Gorska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362-63 (W. Va. 1981).
332. See Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 175 (1992).
333. See id. at 174.
334. See id. at 178, 181.
335. See, e.g., Lunsford v. Lunsford, 545 So. 2d 1279, 1282 (La. Ct. App. 1989)
(overruling trial court that awarded custody to father who "offer[ed] children. . .. a
community that provides equal schools and equal or better living standards").
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Formal equality has often reached farther than was expected
in the sixties. In her 1971 speech quoted earlier, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg predicted that men would not be able to challenge
classifications under the Murray strategy.336 Within four years,
however, the Supreme Court held for a male plaintiff in a Four-
teenth Amendment case.3 ' Men also have challenged success-
fully many sex-specific family law rules favoring women, such as
the primary caretaker presumption, causing the problem dis-
cussed above:38 sex-based rules arguably favoring women have
not been replaced by ideal sex-neutral rules; instead, they often
have been replaced by rules that disadvantage women as home-
makers and caretakers.3 39
For another example of formal equality's reach beyond what
was expected at the close of the sixties, recall Pauli Murray's
discussion of what we today would call affirmative action.
Murray did not expect formal equality to affect such classifica-
tions because they involve rights women need due to traditional
disadvantages.34 The Supreme Court, however, increasingly
uses strict scrutiny to strike racial affirmative action, 4' and it
could take that same approach in cases involving sex-based affir-
mative action in the future, particularly in light of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg's efforts to move the Court closer to strict scrutiny in
sex discrimination cases.342
A closely related set of problems concerns differences between
racial and sexual caste systems. When the Supreme Court began
striking racial classifications, all such classifications were al-
ways and obviously discriminatory against minority groups, typ-
ically African-Americans. Racial classifications created and
336. See supra text accompanying note 295.
337. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
338. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking alimony statute imposing
obligation only on husbands to support wives at divorce).
339. See supra notes 330-35 and accompanying text.
340. See Murray Memorandum, supra note 123, at 17.
341. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying
strict scrutiny to federal affirmative action plan); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (using "heightened scrutiny" to evaluate local govern-
ment race-based affirmative action plan).
342. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996) (suggesting that the
Court might adopt strict scrutiny in future sex cases).
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maintained Jim Crow segregation and were not, even arguably,
affirmative action or good for racial minorities in any way. For
example, anti-miscegenation laws were part of "White Suprema-
cy," to use the language of the Supreme Court.3" Affirmative
action policies did not appear until the 1970s. Initially, the Su-
preme Court tolerated racial classifications that arguably helped
members of racial minorities, as long as they were temporary,
narrowly tailored, and did not involve quotas,3" but the Court
has become increasingly hostile to such policies."'
To be sure, any affirmative action plan has a downside for the
group purportedly being "helped." As conservatives argue, affir-
mative action can stigmatize beneficiaries, lowering their own
confidence levels as well as negatively affecting others' assess-
ments of their abilities.34 Whether a specific affirmative action
plan does more good or harm to the group it purports to help is
an empirical question. Some plans will be hard to judge and oth-
ers clearly will be good or bad. For example, the preference for
minorities in city contracting adopted by the majority African-
American Richmond City Council was a good affirmative action
plan from the perspective of racial minorities, though the Court
struck the plan as unconstitutional.34"
With women, whether sex-specific classifications or preferenc-
es are good or bad is often murky, and this is true historically as
well as today. Whereas racial classifications prior to Brown were
always and only bad for minorities, many pre-second wave sex-
specific rules were good for women relative to some alternatives.
For example, the traditional maternal preference in custody dis-
putes helped certain women in some circumstances, though it
also reinforced the notion that women and only women were
capable of caring for young children. Indeed, one can argue to-
day that just as minority contractors in Richmond, Virginia need
343. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 25 (1967).
344. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305, 315 (1978).
345. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (applying strict scrutiny to federal affirma-
tive action plan); Croson, 488 U.S. at 495 (using strict scrutiny to evaluate local gov-
ernment race-based affirmative action plan).
346. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
347. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 511.
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and benefit from the Richmond plan struck by the Supreme
Court, so too women need and deserve a thumb on the scale in
custody decisions given the biases they currently face in custody
disputes. Yet it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would
see a maternal preference as a form of affirmative action. The
Supreme Court has, after all, grounded its formal equality stan-
dard in the rejection of sex-role stereotypes, and any form of af-
firmative action protecting women who are performing tradition-
al roles-even if necessary and appropriate in light of continuing
biases-inevitably will reinforce traditional stereotypes.
A final problem with formal equality is one Professor
MacKinnon pointed out in 1979: At best, formal equality can
only get women who look like men the rights men enjoy."48 It
cannot generate new rules that accommodate women's styles
and lifestyles as well as men's. 9 For example, in employment,
formal equality can get women the right to compete with men
for jobs under the standards worked out by and for
breadwinners with stay-at-home wives. If men must bill 2800
hours a year at a law firm, formal equality entitles women to
compete under a minimum billable hours rule of 2800 hours per
year, but does nothing to help women combine being lawyers
and primary caretakers of children. Where women's needs are
not identical to men's because of the different roles they and
their partners play in most families, formal equality does
nothing.
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE
Going full steam for formal equality through the courts and
the Constitution may well have been the right decision, as well
as the inevitable one, in the sixties. Now, however, we live in a
far different world. Most overt forms of discrimination against
women in employment and by government are gone, and the
discrimination that remains does not seem vulnerable under
formal equality."'
348. See CATHAINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRMNATION 110 (1979).
349. See id. at 110-11.
350. Some continuing and widely-accepted forms of overt discrimination: many orga-
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In this section, I suggest that as we look to the future from
the vantage point we now enjoy, with much overt discrimination
against women gone, we consider moving away from formal
equality. In a recent article, Reva Siegel points out that when
status hierarchies are contested, they evolve into less contested
forms." 1 For example, laws giving the husband as patriarch all
power, authority, and property in families were replaced, when
contested during the nineteenth century, with rules premised on
the assumption that the home was a private sphere beyond the
reach of the state.352 Work performed by the wife in this
sphere was done for love, not pay, and she could not, therefore,
sue for compensation in either tort or contract even if her hus-
band had expressly agreed to compensate her in writing."'
The resiliency of status hierarchies should not be surprising:
Assuming that something of value is at stake in such a strug-
gle, it is highly unlikely that the regime that emerges from
reform will redistribute material and dignitary "goods" in a
manner that significantly disadvantages the beneficiaries of
the prior, contested regime. But if the reformed body of law is
to reestablish its legitimacy, it must distribute social goods in
a manner that can be differentiated from the prior, contested
regime. Thus, lawmakers seeking to reestablish the legitima-
cy of a contested body of status law will begin to revise its
nizations continue to allow only men to work as priests, ministers, rabbis, clergy,
and members of professional sports teams, and government routinely subsidizes these
discriminatory operations. For a discussion of religious and government subsidations
through tax exemptions, see Mary Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the
Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 453 (1992). Munic-
ipalities routinely subsidize male sports teams by giving them various forms of aid
in building arenas. School and extracurricular sports remain segregated by sex for
the most part, with boys' teams and activities continuing to receive most of the
money and limelight. Cheerleaders at many public high schools continue to be only
girls and they cheer only for boys' teams. Many professional teams also hire only
women as cheerleaders. The military continues to discriminate explicitly, closing all
combat positions to women, even in peacetime, and allowing far fewer women than
men to serve. Women in prison have fewer training opportunities than men and
tend to be trained for lower-paying, typically-female jobs.
351. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving
Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1115-16 (1997).
352. See id. at 1118.
353. See id.
260 [Vol. 40:209
FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE COURTS
constitutive rules, and to justify the new body of law without
overt recourse to the justificatory discourse of the prior, con-
tested regime.... Analyzed from this vantage point, status-
enforcing state action has no fixed or transhistorical form,
but instead evolves in rule structure and justificatory rhetoric
as it is contested."
During the 1970s, as it became impermissible to discriminate
overtly between women and men in many settings, inequality
did not disappear. Prohibited sex-specific versions were replaced
by neutral sounding rules tending to support patriarchy in more
subtle ways. In part, of course, this is success. Women are better
off in a world in which jobs cannot be limited to men only, but it
does not follow that sex discrimination has been eliminated be-
cause many overt classifications based on sex have disappeared.
In thinking about how to approach the future, it is important
to appreciate patriarchy's flexibility and core constituents. Patri-
archy is a social system that can take feudal, capitalist, or so-
cialist forms, but all patriarchal cultures are "male-dominated,
male-identified, and male-centered,"35 as well as centered
around "the core value of control and domination.""5 ' As Allan
Johnson described:
More than anything else, patriarchy is based on control as a
core principle around which entire societies are organized.
What drives patriarchy as a system-what fuels competition,
aggression, and oppression-is a dynamic relationship be-
tween control and fear. Patriarchy encourages men to seek
security, status, and other rewards through control; to fear
other men's ability to control and harm them; and to identify
being in control as both their best defense against loss and
humiliation and the surest route to what they need and de-
sire. In this sense, although we usually think of patriarchy in
terms of women and men, it is more about what goes on
among men. The oppression of women is certainly an impor-
354. Id. at 1119.
355. ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE GENDER KNOT: UNRAVELING OuR PATRIARcHAL LEGA-
cY 84 (1997).
356. Id. at 85.
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tant part of patriarchy, but, paradoxically, it may not be the
point of patriarchy.57
A patriarchal culture is misogynist. It devalues women and jus-
tifies aggression against them because of their depraved na-
tures. In a patriarchal culture, women "can't be trusted, espe-
cially when they're menstruating or accusing men of sexual mis-
conduct." 58 Women exist in such a culture to fill men's needs,
compensating men at the bottom for their failure to climb high-
er. And women are trophies, signaling to other men the status of
the man with the trophy on his arm. In a patriarchal culture,
the legal system, whatever its form, will do a better job protect-
ing men and meeting men's needs than protecting women and
meeting women's needs. 59
A key aspect of women's oppression stems from heterosexual
relations that subordinate women to men's right to sexual access
and control.60 The core of patriarchy is not the battle between
the sexes."' Rather, it is a battle largely between men for pow-
er and control.362 Men who do not conform to patriarchy's no-
tion of masculinity pay an extremely high cost.
Women and men become invisible under different conditions
in patriarchal culture.
In general, women are made invisible when they do some-
thing that might elevate their status, such as raising children
into healthy adults or coming up with a brilliant idea at a
business meeting. Men, however, are often made invisible
when their behavior is socially undesirable and might raise
questions about the appropriateness of male privilege.3"
357. Id. at 26.
358. Id. at 86.
359. See Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 81-82 (1987).
360. See JOHNSON, supra note 355, at 70.
361. But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
3-4 (1989) (describing heterosexuality as the key social structure to the subordination
of women); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5-8 (1987) (stating
that the crux of sexual hierarchy is the sexualization of women's subordination and
inferiority).
362. See JOHNSON, supra note 355, at 26.
363. Id. at 156.
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Although patriarchy is "male-dominated, male-identified, and
male-centered,""' it easily can be supported by sex-neutral
rules. For example, the neutral best interest standard for custo-
dy at divorce functions admirably in a patriarchal culture. In
such a culture, when men do something good, such as function
as good-enough fathers, their success is easily seen and readily
appreciated. When women succeed by being good-enough moth-
ers, they tend to remain invisible. Conversely, when men do
something bad, such as abuse women or children, they tend to
become inyisible in the legal system and elsewhere. When wom-
en do something bad, such as abuse their children or kill their
abusive spouse, they tend to be easily seen. 65 These aspects of
patriarchy are visible today in our legal system.
Sex-neutral rules supporting patriarchy are male-centered and
male-identified, meeting men's needs more effectively than
women's needs and valuing masculine traits over feminine
traits. If our goal is greater equality between women and men,
we must move towards a less patriarchal culture, one which
does a better job of meeting women's needs and valuing feminine
traits and women's labor as well as masculine traits and men's
labor. Large legislative bodies allow for many people with di-
verse backgrounds, experiences, and perspectives to deliberate
about and enact legislation. 66 Unfortunately, most of the mem-
bers of our legislative bodies are men; more diverse legislatures
might do a better job of serving women's needs and valuing
women's traits and labor.3"' In light of this problem and the
problems discussed earlier with the formal equality standard
364. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
365. See Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social
Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. Cmi. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 14-15 (1995) (stating that even when men are the abusers,
mother of the child is more likely to be charged with neglect than the abuser).
366. See Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REv. 633, 635
(1995).
367. For discussions of fiow law contributes to the undervaluation of women's labor,
see Katharine Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming October 1998); Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's
Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 81 (1997); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning
Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Nancy
Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 571 (1996).
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applied by the Supreme Court in sex discrimination cases, I sug-
gest two concrete changes-a new ERA and a Voting Rights Act
for Women:
1. A New ERA. This ERA would have language more like
the Fourteenth Amendment than either earlier ERA and
would give ultimate authority on questions of sex equality to
the federal Congress rather than to the Supreme Court. In
addition, it would guarantee that one senator from each state
be a woman.
Section 1. Neither any state nor the federal government
shall deprive any woman or man of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any woman
or man within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Section 2. Each state shall have at least one senator
who is a woman. Congress shall, through appropriate leg-
islation, establish laws to enforce this provision and may
determine that it becomes effective only upon the re-
tirement of male incumbents.
Section 3. Congress shall have the ultimate power to en-
force this Amendment and to determine its scope and
meaning.
2. A Voting Rights Act for Women. This Act would be de-
signed to do what the Voting Rights Act did for racial minori-
ties when it was at its most effective: ensure proportionate
representation for women in legislative bodies. For example,
parties might be encouraged through federal campaign con-
tributions to run female candidates for races without an in-
cumbent.3" Electoral systems might be changed to provide
for multi-member districts with cumulative voting or propor-
tionate representation.369
368. The single biggest disadvantage women face is that they are less likely than
men to be incumbents, and incumbents win the vast majority of American elections.
See Janet Clark, Getting There: Women in Political Office, 515 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. Sd. 63 (1991). One of incumbents' biggest advantages is in raising
funds, and a Voting Rights Act for Women enacted pursuant to the proposed new
ERA might be able to avoid Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which found limits
on individual campaign contributions unconstitutional.
369. See LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 119-156 (1994).
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By including "woman" and "man," this ERA suggests that
sometimes women and men might have different needs, so that
different approaches might be appropriate to ensure equal pro-
tection of the laws. The refusal to protect women from marital
rape, which is still the policy of many states in the absence of
extreme violence, might well be a denial of equal protection to
women under it."70
This Amendment would give ultimate enforcement authority
to the Congress, rather than the Supreme Court and, in doing
so, give this authority to a body, one of whose chambers would
be at least fifty percent women. These women would be operat-
ing in a legislative setting, not the more conservative judicial
setting, in which legitimacy is gauged by consistency with prior
(often patriarchal) decisions.
Even without a Senate containing at least fifty women, the
constitutional amendment I have proposed would be advisable.
Because of problems in the non-ideal world in which we live,
affirmative action for women often is necessary to offset not just
past discrimination, but continuing patriarchal attitudes and
values. Affirmative action may be appropriate with respect to
child custody, for example, and in many employment settings,
particularly those that regard masculine traits as essential for
effective performance. Sex-specific rules might be appropriate in
other areas as well. Perhaps, for example, we should encourage
all-female schools, quotas of at least fifty percent women for
various governmental entities, and an all-female all-volunteer
combat unit.
A final set of advantages in giving the United States Congress
the final say on the meaning of equality concerns the legislative
process. Cultural and social changes are key to any meaningful
shift in status hierarchies. The debates, at dinner tables as well
as on the floor of Congress, sparked by legislative consideration
of what equality between women and men means would be valu-
able both in terms of creating more of a consensus on this issue
and in terms of changing social and cultural attitudes and pat-
terns of behavior." 1
370. See Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REv. 45, 45 (1990).
371. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to
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This ERA substitutes federal congressional supremacy for ju-
dicial review on sex discrimination issues. Legislative bodies can
respond with far greater flexibility than the Supreme Court to
changes in the formulation of justifications for a status hierar-
chy such as patriarchy. In the end, equality inevitably will de-
pend on women's effective assertion of their political power be-
cause the Supreme Court, with its limited role, cannot imple-
ment equality between women and men. This ERA recognizes
and is consistent with that reality.
Regardless of whether we can enact the new ERA and Voting
Rights Act, our top priority should be getting women into legis-
lative office in numbers proportionate to their numbers in the
population so that they can make the kind of detailed legal
changes necessary if the laws are to protect women as well as
men, and to value caretaking as well as wage work. Europe and
many other parts of the world are ahead of us on this point.
Their approach is one that is unimaginable under the formal
equality standard developed and enforced by the United States
Supreme Court. It includes quotas and explicit preferences of
various kinds for women in electoral office. 7 2
We are so used to women's underrepresentation in elective
office that we do not see it as undermining the legitimacy of our
"democracy." If women were some other historically disadvan-
taged and still subordinate majority group with similar levels of
representation in a purported democracy, we immediately would
question the legitimacy of the electoral structure. Christine
Boyle, a Canadian scholar, makes this point in the form of a hy-
pothetical:
Imagine a country in which all or most of the women, but not
the men, lived in one geographical area - for example, On-
tario. One can then examine the laws applying to and the
Make Social Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 990 (1997) (reflecting on experiences
and concluding that the "culture-shifting" essential for social change is more likely to
come through legislative change than through top-down constitutional pro-
nouncements from the courts).
372. See Jo Lynn Southard, Protection of Women's Human Rights Under the Con-
vention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 8 PACE
INT'L L. REv. 1, 34 (1996) (noting, however, that many quota systems have been
eliminated, causing a decline in the number of women holding office).
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economic position of "Ontarians" from a neutral standpoint. It
will be found that the position of Ontarians is not good in
Canadian society. They have been systematically discriminat-
ed against throughout their history; for example, their prop-
erty was taken from them without compensation, they had no
rights to their children, enfranchisement was ridiculed and
bitterly opposed, and they still rarely sit in Parliament or on
the bench. They are subjected to assault and sexual abuse by
non-Ontarians, and they largely work at menial tasks for
which they are paid much less than non-Ontarians, or noth-
ing. In addition, they are depicted ever more widely by vari-
ous media as being less than human, as objects for the sexual
gratification of non-Ontarians. One has only to attempt such
an account to realize that there exist two fundamentally dif-
ferent groups in Canada (and, of course, elsewhere). It is sub-
mitted that an electoral system which does not reflect any
confrontation of that fact is inadequate. 73
Boyle goes on to suggest that we naturally would propose sepa-
rate representation along geographic lines for the problem of the
Ontarians. We tend to look at non-geographically based sep-
arate-representation schemes with great suspicion, however,
particularly when the suggestion is separate representation for
women and men. This is linked to another important difference
between patriarchy and white supremacy-the much stronger
need to deny conflicts of interest between women and men be-
cause of our integration in families and in intimate relation-
ships. 75 Requiring a minimum of one woman senator from
each state might serve an important symbolic role in reminding
us that women and men often have different experiences and
perspectives and sometimes have conflicting interests. 76
Whether a senate half of whose members were women would
make a significant difference in substantive legislative outcomes
373. Christine Boyle, Home Rule for Women: Power-Sharing Between Men and
Women, 7 DALHOUSIE L.J. 790, 796 (1983). For a discussion of why racial represen-
tation is as effective in representing groups as geographic representation, see
GUINIER, supra note 369, at 137-155.
374. See Boyle, supra note 373, at 799.
375. See JOHNSON, supra note 355, at 21; Mary E. Becker, Politics, Differences, and
Economic Rights, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAJ, F. 169, 183-85.
376. See Becker, supra note 375, at 185.
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is, of course, unclear. But given the different needs, perspectives,
and experiences of many women and men, such a senate might
well behave differently." We cannot, of course, know whether
it would until it exists.78
As noted earlier, quotas and other forms of electoral prefer-
ences exist for women in many other countries. Indeed, electoral
quotas for women are becoming the norm in Western European
democracies,7 9 though most Americans would find them un-
imaginable and are unaware of how common they are elsewhere.
Most countries in the world have parliamentary systems with
some form of proportionate representation. This means that a
party has the same proportion of members in the parliament as
that party's share of the electoral vote. 80 Thus, if Party A has
20% of the vote in the parliamentary election, 20% of the mem-
bers of the parliament will be from Party A. In many countries,
each party fields a list of candidates and which of the party's
candidates are in the legislative body depends on the candidate's
position on the list and the party's proportion of the vote. If the
377. One need not believe female and male representatives would behave differently
because of essential differences between the sexes. See Mary Fainsod Katzenstein,
Feminism and the Meaning of the Vote, 10 SIGNS 4, 24 (1984) (making this point in
the context of an argument for a "full-scale feminist commitment to electoral poli-
tics").
378. The available empirical evidence suggests that women may have different pri-
orities and commitments than other legislators. See SUE THOMAS, How WOMEN LEG-
ISLATE 134 (1994); Susan J. Carroll, The Politics of Difference: Women Public Offi-
cials as Agents of Change, STAN. L. & POL' REV., Spring 1994, at 11, 12. We see
separate representation as appropriate for different geographic regions without be-
lieving in essential differences between those who live in them. African-American
voters vote differently from white voters in the South. See Richard H. Pildes, The
Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1995) (book review). We do not, however,
ascribe essentialist reasons to racial differences in voting. Note that because of
women's majority status, the case for proportionate representation of women in
elected office is simpler than the question whether districts should be drawn so as
to maximize the number of African-American representatives, thereby lessening other
representatives' (the majority) commitment to African-American communities. See id.
I do not, however, recommend separate voting districts for women and men through-
out the electoral systems of the United States, because the larger districts necessary
for such a scheme would decrease the number of minority representatives.
379. See infra notes 382-395 and accompanying text.
380. See generally BRIAN THOMPSON, TEXTBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 146-48 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the differences between the parliamentary
systems in place in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland).
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parliament contains 200 seats, each party, including Party A,
will publish a list of 200 candidates. If Party A gets 20% of the
vote, 40 parliamentarians will be members of Party A, and they
will be the first 40 individuals on Party A's list of 200 candi-
dates. In general, women do better as candidates in proportion-
ate representation electoral systems, such as the one just de-
scribed, than in single-member district electoral schemes, such
as those common in the United States.38'
Sweden leads the world with the highest proportion of women
in parliament: 40.4% . This result was achieved by a commit-
ment from the five leading political parties that women and men
alternate positions on party lists.3" Finland's parties adopted a
40% quota for women in 1995," and political parties in Nor-
way regularly field 50% women candidates either by tradition or
party rules.385 In Britain, the Labor Party has quotas requiring
40% women at all party levels and it ran women in 50% of the
open or "winnable" seats, but this policy was struck by a court in
a challenge from rejected male candidates who argued that it
discriminated against men.88 In Spain, party quotas range be-
tween 25% and 50%."' Other countries with party quotas in-
381. See R.E. Matland & M.M. Taylor, Electoral System Effects on Women's Rep-
resentation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica, 30 COMP. POL.
SYS. 186-210 (1998) (finding that women's representation is positively affected by
party magnitude); Judy Mann, Eastern Bloc Women's Time Has Come, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 1990, at C3 [hereinafter Mann, Eastern Bloc]; Judy Mann, European Gender
Gap, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1988, at B3 [hereinafter Mann, Gender Gap].
382. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Quotas Boost Women Pols, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONI-
TOR, May 14, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2801135.
383. See id.
384. See id.
385. See id.
386. See id. Nevertheless, the number of women in the Parliament nearly doubled
in the May 1, 1997 election. See id. The ruling came after some candidates had
been slated and many local parties resented the ruling and selected women in spite
of it. See id.
387. See Pat Healy, If It Won't Shift, Push It, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 1993, at
T12, available in 1993 WL 10812224. The Spanish Socialist Party took steps to en-
sure that 25% of its candidates were women; other parties were moving towards
50%. See id. The Spanish Parliament has since boosted female representation to
16%. See Chaddock, supra note 382, at 1.
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clude Germany, 88  Mexico,'89  South Africa, 9  France,39'
India,'9 ' and Egypt.' Italian parties adopted quotas that the
Italian Supreme Court subsequently declared unconstitution-
al. 94 Belgium is the only country that has instituted quotas at
the national, rather than party, level.' 95
388. Germany has increased its proportion of women in Parliament to 26.5% under
the quota. See Chaddock, supra note 382, at 1. Germany actually uses party list
seats to compensate for what happens in two single-member district seats, making
the whole parliament proportional to party vote. See Common Ground. Democratic
Alternatives, Part II (radio broadcast, Feb. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Common Ground].
389. See Chaddock, supra note 382, at 1. Like Argentina, the Mexican government
has made quotas compulsory for all political parties. See id. In most countries, the
quota decisions are left to the individual parties. See France-Chabadabadz, THE
ECONOMIST, June 28, 1997, at 52, available in LEXIS, News Library, Econ File.
390. With the end of apartheid came the realization that the one-man, one-vote
system was not enough to ensure representation. As every major faction supported
the principle of proportional representation, it was incorporated into South Africa's
new constitution. This was especially impressive because the African National Con-
gress probably could have dominated a winner-take-all system election. See Common
Ground, supra note 388.
391. Only the Socialist Party has a quota for women (approximately one-third of all
seats) in France, but that single quota has doubled the number of women in parlia-
ment to 11%. See France-Chabadabadz, supra note 389, at 52. Until the June 1,
1997 vote, France ranked dead last in Europe in women's representation in parlia-
ment. See Gail Russell Chaddock, Socialist Win Means 'Vive L'Egalite!': Recent Elec-
tions in France Highlight a Trend Toward Bringing More Women into Politics,
CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, June 6, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 2801716.
392. A 1993 amendment to India's constitution reserved "a third of the seats in
local councils known as panchaya" for women. Kenneth Cooper, Indian Mandate
Boosts Women in Local Politics; Quotas Put Nearly a Million on Councils, WASH.
POST, Aug. 26, 1996, at A8.
393. The Egyptian quota system, which reserved a minimum number of parliamen-
tary seats for women, survived for less than a decade. The system was revoted in
1987, mainly because it had no relevance in a country ruled by a powerful elite that
had no commitment to democratic representation. Quotas were replaced by a new
law that guaranteed a seat in each constituency to independent candidates, male or
female. See Women's Thorny Road to Political Equality in Egypt, MONEYCLIPS, Feb.
17, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Moclip File.
394. The Italian Parliament passed legislation setting mandatory quotas for women
in elections in lieu of waiting for Italy's many parties to instigate their own policies.
See France-Chabadabadz, supra note 389, at 52. In 1996, these quotas were declared
unconstitutional. See id. Indeed, successful quota systems have often required an
amendment or, in the case of newly emerging democracies, a new constitution. See
Common Ground, supra note 388.
395. See France-Chabadabadz, supra note 389, at 52. By the end of the century, no
more than two-thirds of the candidates found on Belgian electoral lists may be of
the same sex. See id.
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Although the United States sees itself as the world leader on
sex equality, it has fallen behind other nations in its willingness
to experiment with various ways to achieve electoral equality for
women. The formal equality standard enforced by the Supreme
Court is part of the problem, a palpable obstacle making it diffi-
cult even to imagine, let alone seriously discuss, the use of elec-
toral quotas or other affirmative action for women in politics in
the United States.3 6
CONCLUSION
During the 1960s, American feminists ended a forty year
stalemate over which strategy to use to improve women's status
and material conditions. By the end of the sixties, American
feminists were all supporting formal equality, to be achieved
either under the Fourteenth Amendment or through the ERA.
Given the negative consequences for women of most sex-specific
legislation at the time, and the need to end the stalemate be-
396. The Democratic and Republican Parties both have sex-specific quotas today:
their national committees consist of a woman and a man from each state. See
BECKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 911. At least some party actions are state action.
See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (holding that when Texas legislature dele-
gated to the State Executive Committee of each party the ability to set eligibility re-
quirements for participation in primary and Democratic State Executive Committee
requiring whiteness, there was state action and a violation of the right of African-
Americans to vote).
Several states have gender balance policies, providing that boards, commissions,
committees, and councils of various kinds appointed by elected officials be gender
balanced. See Report of the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 Mo. L.
REv. 485, 701 (1993). At least two states have enacted legislation explicitly so pro-
viding. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 69.16A (West 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-06-19
(1989). Montana has a non-binding gender balance resolution. See MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 2-15-108 (1997). Iowa has a mandatory requirement that one woman and one man
must be elected to the position of Judicial Nominating Commissioner from each dis-
trict. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 46.4 (West 1991).
Several federal entities have quotas based on party affiliation. For example, the
Federal Election Commission has six members, and no more than three are to "be
affiliated with the same political party." 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(1) (1994). The Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission, each consist of five members, no more than three to be
"members of the same political party." 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1994) (SEC); 15 U.S.C. §
41 (1994); 7 U.S.CA § 4a(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998) (CFTC). Similar rules apply to
the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1422a(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tween feminist camps, this consensus is easy to understand and
was perhaps the best available option at the time.
Today, however, we live in a different world. In this world,
formal equality is a barrier to the flexibility and experimenta-
tion needed to combat the new, sex neutral ways in which law
supports patriarchy. In this essay, I have suggested that it is
time to think about what approaches would be effective in the
future, given formal equality's important successes and its limi-
tations, limitations which are obvious today but were unforesee-
able in 1970.
I have suggested that we seek (1) a new ERA providing for
equal protection of women and men under the laws, requiring
that one senator from each state be a woman, and giving ulti-
mate enforcement power to the Congress rather than the Su-
preme Court as well as (2) a Voting Rights Act for Women. Be-
cause patriarchy can be supported by sex-neutral rules, we need
to increase the number of women in office beyond token num-
bers and give them the power to experiment with a variety of
approaches as we attempt to move toward a culture that is less
male-centered, male-identified, and male-dominated.
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. APPEiDIX A
Equal Protection Sex-Discrimination Cases
from Reed v. Reed to May 1998
CASES FOLLOWED BY ***: DISCRIMINATION ARGUABLY PROTECTS
MATERNAL AND FAMILY FUNCTIONS.
1. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (female plaintiff wins;
Court strikes state statute creating preference for male estate
executors).
2. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (female plain-
tiff wins; Court strikes rule automatically giving benefits to
spouses of men, but not spouses of women, in the Air Force).***
3. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 US. 351 (1974) (male plaintiff loses;
upholding property tax exemption for widows).***
4. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (female plaintiff los-
es; Court holds pregnancy discrimination in state disability plan
not sex discrimination).
5. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (male plaintiff
loses; Court upholds rule giving women two more years in rank
under military officer up-or-out policy).
6. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (male plaintiff
wins; Court holds that women must be included on juror roles).
7. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (male plain-
tiff wins; Court holds that widower must be given Social Securi-
ty benefits available to the widow).***
8. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (female plaintiff wins;
Court strikes statute creating different ages of majority for boys
and girls).
9. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 1 (1976) (male plaintiff wins;
Court holds unconstitutional different rules on ability of young
people to buy 3.2% beer).
10. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 US. 199 (1977) (male plaintiff
wins; Court holds unconstitutional differential social security
benefits provided for widows and widowers).***
11. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (male plaintiff
loses; Court upholds temporary provision giving women an ad-
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vantage in calculating Social Security benefits upon retire-
ment).***
12. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (male plaintiff loses;
Court upholds provision of immigration law giving mothers and
their illegitimate children a more privileged status than that
accorded to fathers and their illegitimate children).***
13. Orr v. Orr, 440 US. 268 (1979) (male plaintiff wins; Court
holds that alimony statute imposing obligation on husbands only
to support wives after divorce under certain circumstances vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause).***
14. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (male plaintiff
loses; Court upholds statute precluding father from suing for the
wrongful death of his child if paternity had not been established
prior to child's death).
15. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (male plaintiff
wins; Court holds that unwed father's consent is needed for
adoption when he has established relationship with child).
16. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (female plaintiff
wins; Court holds that congressman who refuses to hire women
for staff positions discriminates on the basis of sex in violation of
Constitution).
17. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256 (1979) (female plaintiff loses; Court holds preference for
veterans in state employment not sex discrimination).
18. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (male plaintiff loses; Court holds
that rights created by Title VII cannot be asserted in an equal
protection action under § 1985(3)).
19. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979) (female plaintiff
wins; Court strikes statute giving aid to low-income two-parent
families when the father, but not the mother, was unemployed;
Court extends program to two-parent families with unemployed
mothers).
20. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Company, 446 U.S.
142 (1980) (male plaintiff wins; Court strikes workers' compen-
sation law requiring widower, but not widow, to show incapaci-
tation or dependence in order to receive death benefits).***
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21. Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S.
464 (1981) (male plaintiff loses; Court upholds statutory rape
law applicable only against males).
22. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (female plaintiff
wins; Court strikes down community property law giving hus-
band unilateral control of jointly owned marital property).
23. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (male plaintiff
loses; Court upholds selective service registration limited to
males).
24. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982) (male plaintiff wins; Court holds that Mississippi cannot
offer only women a nursing school).
25. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (male 'plaintiff
loses; Court upholds temporary, gender-based pension offset ex-
ception to Social Security survivor benefits).***
26. Bray v. Alexandria Womens' Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263
(1993) (female plaintiff loses; Court holds that obstruction of
abortion facilities by protesters is not sex discrimination).
27. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (male plaintiff
wins; Court holds unconstitutional peremptory challenges of pro-
spective jurors based on sex (defendant's lawyer in paternity
action had struck women from the jury)).
28. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (female plaintiff
wins; Court holds that Virginia Military Institute cannot admit
only men).
29. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (plaintiff not a
male but daughter of a male; six justices uphold refusal to ex-
tend her citizenship though, had her mother been the U.S. citi-
zen rather than her father, she would have qualified for citizen-
ship; of the six justices voting to dismiss the claim, two held that
the daughter did not have standing to raise her father's claim of
sex discrimination, two held that she had standing but the sex-
based discrimination was permissible because serving important
governmental interests, and two held that the Court lacked the
power to grant the relief requested regardless of her standing
and the merits of the claim).***
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APPENDIX B
Equal Protection Sex-Discrimination Cases
from Reed v. Reed to May 1998 Involving Discrimination that
Arguably Protects Maternal and Family Functions
ARGUMENT WINS
1. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (male plaintiff loses;
upholding property tax exemption for widows that was not also
available to widowers).
2. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (male plaintiff los-
es; Court upholds provision giving women an advantage in cal-
culating social security benefits upon retirement).
3. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (male plaintiff loses;
Court upholds provision of immigration laws giving mothers and
their illegitimate children a more privileged status than that
accorded to fathers and their illegitimate children).
4. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (male plaintiff
loses; Court upholds temporary, gender based pension offset ex-
ception to Social Security survivor benefits).
5. Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998) (plaintiff not a
male but daughter of a male; six justices uphold refusal to ex-
tend her citizenship though, had her mother been the U.S. citi-
zen rather than her father, she would have qualified for citizen-
ship; of the six justices voting to dismiss the claim, two held that
the daughter did not have standing to raise her father's claim of
sex discrimination, two held that she had standing but the sex-
based discrimination was permissible because serving important
governmental interests, and two held that the Court lacked the
power to grant the relief requested regardless of her standing
and the merits of the claim).
ARGUMENT LOSES
1. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (female plain-
tiff wins; Court strikes rule automatically giving benefits to
spouses of men, but not spouses of women, in the Air Force).
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2. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (male plain-
tiff wins; Court holds that widower must be given Social Securi-
ty benefits available to the widow).
3. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (male plaintiff
wins; Court holds unconstitutional differential social security
benefits provided for widows and widowers).
4. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (male plaintiff wins; Court
holds alimony statute imposing obligation on husbands only to
support wives after divorce under certain circumstances violates
Equal Protection Clause).
5. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Company, 446 U.S.
142 (1980) (male plaintiff wins; Court strikes workers' compen-
sation law requiring widower, but not widow, to show incapaci-
tation or dependence in order to receive death benefits).
